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NEWS

OSSREA Appoints a New Executive Director

Former Zambian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Amb. Prof. Royson Mukwena has been appointed Executive Director for the Organization of Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) with effect from 1st March 2012.

While serving as High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Prof. Mukwena was also Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Zambia (resident in London) to The Holy See and Ireland. Previously he served as High Commissioner to the United Republic of Tanzania and while in Dar es Salaam was also Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Zambia (resident in Dar es Salaam) to the Republic of Burundi, Rwanda, Union of the Comoros and High Commissioner to Uganda and also accredited to the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

Amb. Prof. Royson Mukwena

As an Ambassador, Prof. Mukwena, undertook special diplomatic assignments such as delivering special messages on behalf of the Zambian President to other Presidents as a Special Envoy, representing the Foreign Minister and other Ministers at international meetings and leading Zambian delegations to international meetings.

In terms of academic experience Prof. Mukwena previously lectured in Public Administration at the Universities of Zambia and Namibia and served the latter also as Head of the Department of Political and Administrative Studies and Deputy Dean and Acting Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Management Science. And he also successfully supervised several Masters and Doctoral students. He has also in the past undertaken consultancy and research projects for international organizations such as the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), UK Overseas Development Agency (now DFID), NORAD, World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF and USAID. He also assisted in the preparation of Namibia’s Second National Development plan during the period October 2000-March 2001 under contract to Plenisat Luxemburg and also participated in the preparation of Namibia’s Vision 2030 document.

In terms of Project Management, Prof. Mukwena has in the past managed projects funded by the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and Finland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Prof. Mukwena’s articles on local government, decentralisation and fiscal decentralisation in Zambia and Namibia, and on privatization in Africa, have appeared in several international journals. He is also co-editor of Governance in Southern Africa and Beyond: Experiences of Developing Countries and Decentralisation and Regional and Local Government in Namibia. He has also authored several book chapters on various topics in the field of Public Administration.

Amb. Prof. Mukwena holds a Bachelor of Arts (Public Administration/Development Studies) and Master of Public Administration (MPA) degrees from the University of Zambia and a PhD in Public Administration from The University of Manchester.
As OSSREA Executive Director, Amb. Prof. Mukwena indicates that his immediate tasks are to ensure that existing high standards of performance at OSSREA are maintained and existing donors are kept on board. He also indicates that his long-term goals are to further improve the performance of OSSREA and bring on board new donors and expand on OSSREA’s scope of activities. Prof. Mukwena hints he will pay special attention to the role OSSREA is playing in supporting PhD training in the region’s universities as he believes that improvement in the quality and quantity of PhD graduates will play a critical role in the advancement of the African development agenda. Amb. Prof. Mukwena promises that, using his diplomatic and academic experiences, he will strive to further bridge the gap between research and policy sectors and bring OSSREA further closer to governments in the region. He expresses his hopes that OSSREA’s National Chapters will play a Key role in bridging the gap between researchers and policy makers and further increasing the influence of OSSREA’s research output on policy making.

OSSREA Secretariat welcomes him onboard and wishes him success in his new leadership role.

**OSSREA Executive Committee and Donors Meet**

OSSREA held its annual meetings with its Executive Committee on the 23rd of April 2012 and with its donors on the 24th of April 2012.

Amb. Prof. Royson M. Mukwena, the new Executive Director of OSSREA, was introduced to the EC at its first meeting of 2012 where he presented the OSSREA Annual Report for 2011. During the meeting the previous minutes were approved and discussed as well as the Annual Report of 2011, the Audit Report of 2011 and the Activity Plan for 2012 were approved. EC members also presented reports on their portfolios and resource mobilisation efforts for 2011. Lastly, the OSSREA Constitutional Review and 11th Congress were discussed in detail before the adoption of the agenda for the donors the following day.

On the 24th of April 2012, the new Executive Director met the donors and Research, Publications and Dissemination and Finance and Administration directors presented the Annual Report for 2011, as well as reports of the respective directorates. An OSSREA evaluation, as well as an update on RESSESA, and financing modalities and institutional support, were also thoroughly discussed. The meeting ended with promising statements by donor representatives who said they would support OSSREA if the organisation keeps up its good work.

**OSSREA and AfDB Delegation Discuss about the RESSESA Project**

An AfDB delegation headed by the Education Senior Specialist Ms. Maria T. M. Mdachi was at OSSREA Headquarters from March 26th to 29th 2012 to discuss the RESSESA Proposal that had been submitted to the Bank.

On the first day the delegation was given a very warm welcome by the President of OSSREA, Professor Habtamu Wondimu and the Executive Director Ambassador Professor Royson M. Mukwena who next gave presentations on the historical background of OSSREA and its structure. The Directors of the Secretariat then presented on their respective Directorates and Professor Paschal Mihyo, the ex-ED of OSSREA and initiator of the RESSESA, and Dr Paulos Chanie presented the RESSESA project.

During the second day, presentations were made by Dr Moges Yigezu, the RESSESA Focal person and member of the Technical Advisory Committee and Professor Baye Yimam, Director of the College of Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities and Faculty of Language Studies. Following this, the AfDB delegation was introduced to the President of Addis Ababa University, Dr Tsegaye Admasu who talked about the vision of the university and its graduate program. At this meeting OSSREA handed over the foundation and methodology books, as well
as OSSREA books to the Graduate Program of the university, as it is part of the RESSESA project.

The third day was totally devoted to an institutional assessment of OSSREA which ended with an understanding that OSSREA is capable of handling such projects and would be more than capable of handling the AfDB-OSSREA project, as well.

The last day concluded with the signing of a draft Aide Memoire between the East African Community (EAC), The African Development Bank Group and OSSREA to implement the RESSESA project.

Zambia Embassy in Addis Ababa Visits OSSREA

Ms. Dorcas Ilunga Chileshe, the First Secretary from the Zambian Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia visited the OSSREA Headquarters on March 21st 2012 at 10:00am.

During the briefing the First Secretary was taken through OSSREA’s research and publication activities respectively by the Director of Research, Dr Paulos Chanie and the Director of Publications and Dissemination, Dr Abiye Daniel. After the presentations, questions were raised about the connection between OSSREA and the universities and the dissemination of OSSREA’s output. The discussion ended with the understanding that there would be a further strengthening of relations between the Embassy and OSSREA and an agreement that OSSREA would add the Embassy to the mailing list.

OSSREA Meets the Addis Ababa University President

A delegation headed by the President of OSSREA Prof. Habtamu Wondimu and composed of The Executive Director of OSSREA Amb. Prof. Royson M. Mukwena, the AfDB representative Madam Maria T.M. Mdachi, the OSSREA Finance and Administration Director Mr Hassen Abeaw and the Director of Publications and Dissemination Dr Abiye Daniel, visited the AAU and talked to the President Dr Admasu Tsegaye on March 27th 2012 at 11:00am.

The President of AAU thanked the delegation for visiting AAU especially in regards to the RESSESA Project that supports the AAU PhD programs in the Social Sciences. Dr Admasu talked about the expansion of universities in the country which are at present 32. He also indicated that the AAU has expanded its graduate programs to the present 215 in which 11,000 students are attending at present.

The Executive Director of OSSREA Ambassador Royson M. Mukwena also thanked the President for all the support that is being afforded to OSSREA and handed over copies of the Poverty Reduction Strategies program that was funded by AfDB and implemented by OSSREA.

Madam Maria T.M. Mdachi talked about how universities can apply for funding based on the country specific strategy and the Ethiopian Growth and Transformation Plan.

Dr Abiye Daniel handed over the list of books that had been purchased and availed to the university by the RESSESA project and the OSSREA publications for the Research Methodology training that is given by OSSREA for PhD students at Addis Ababa University.

A total of 336 books were given to the Post Graduate Library of Social Sciences at the AAU at Sidist Kilo.

The meeting ended with a promise by all organizations to continue working together in the future and to strengthen their ties as well as develop new ones.

OSSREA at the Sixth Book Fair

The Sixth Book Fair organized by Addis Ababa University Press took place from April 2nd to April 8th 2012 in the premises of the Addis Ababa University main campus.

The Book Fair attracted large crowds of readers, buyers, and visitors from the academia, students, and the general public in and around
publications with a 50% discount. OSSREA’s sales were higher compared to the sales during the previous book fairs. This shows that OSSREA’s publications are in demand.

From left: The AAU Vice President for Research and Graduate Programs Prof. Masresha Fetene, the AAU President Dr Admasu Tsegaye, the AAU Press Head Dr. Yakob Arsano, and the Ethiopian Writers’ Association Vice President Mr. Dereje Gebre visit the OSSREA stand displayed by its staff members standing on the right side.

The most in-demand titles were the Social Science Research Methodology series Module I, II and III, which seems to indicate that readings on research methodology are in demand. The second most in-demand was Under Development in Ethiopia, which may be because this book reflects the Ethiopian reality. Equal third goes to three books: Setting of New Social Science Agendas for Africa in the 21st Century, Institutions and Gender Inequality: A Case Study of the Constituency Development Fund in Kenya and Language Ideologies and Challenges of Multilingual Education in Ethiopia: The Case of Harari Region. In fact, also most of the other titles sold fairly well.
FEATURE ARTICLES

Social Marketing and the Fight against Malaria in Uganda Using Insecticide Treated Nets

Julius Omona

Abstract

This analysis on social marketing and insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) was undertaken to contribute to: a) the continuing debate and search for a better strategy for combating malaria; and b) theory building on social marketing. The paper undertook a review of documents on malaria, Population Services International (PSI) and ITNs. It was found that however good intentioned social marketing is, in the case of ITNs in Uganda, it is counterproductive as the pricing de-motivates clients. It was established that if Uganda is to effectively address the MDG six on malaria, and implement other African Malaria partnership declarations, it requires a high degree of political commitment. The paper contributes to the continuing debates on how best to fight Malaria. It adds its views to that of Professors Curtis and Sachs that comprehensive malaria control in Africa in general is achievable by 2015 if sound principles of public health and economics are observed.

Key words: Social marketing, Population Services International, malaria, insecticides treated nets, MDGs.

Introduction and Methods

This paper has been developed in the face of a widespread malaria incidence to an epidemic level in Uganda, and the increasing role of social marketing as a key strategy of intervention in the fight against this killer disease. Use of Insecticide-Treated Nets (ITNs) is an initiative that has been explored because of its increasingly appealing role by donors and other agencies as one of the most effective tools for preventing malaria. There are two key rationales for undertaking this analysis, these are: a) to contribute to the continuing debate and search for a better strategy for combating malaria in Uganda and the world over; and b) theory building on social marketing. Content analysis and literature review have been the major sources of data and information that have helped to shape this paper.

Overview and Contextual Background on Malaria

Malaria poses one of the greatest threats to human life in the developing world. Of the estimated 1 million malaria deaths worldwide, 90 per cent occur in Africa, killing mostly young children at the rate of one child every 30 seconds. Anti-malarial medicines are a critical component in the fight against malaria, alongside other preventive interventions such as ITNs and indoor residual spraying (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS). Currently, malaria is estimated to cost US$ 12 billion a year in lost productivity in Africa alone. In countries with a very heavy malaria burden, the disease can account for as much as 40 per cent of public expenditure, 50 per cent of inpatient admissions and up to 60 per cent of outpatient visits (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTERNA...)

Julius Omona is a lecturer in the Department of Social Work and Social Administration, Makerere University, where he teaches policy and organizational-related courses, both at post- and undergraduate levels. He is also an Executive Director of Anaka Foundation (http://www.anakafoundation.org)- an indigenous NGO that empowers the environment of vulnerable children in northern Uganda. He graduated with a BA (Social Work and Social Administration) degree from Makerere University, Kampala (Uganda) in 1987; obtained a Master of Arts degree in Development Studies in 1999 (Majoring in Public Policy and Administration) from The Hague, The Netherlands; and a PhD in Public Policy and Management from Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand (2004). Ph: +256782452618, E-mail: omonaju@ss.mak.ac.ug, omonaj@yahoo.co.uk

ITNs have been used synonymously with LLINT (Long-Lasting Insecticides Treated Nets).
Omona (2009) further notes that concern about malaria has become more than just a health issue. Responsibility goes beyond the health sector. Heads of state are increasingly engaged. We see this in Africa, when presidents, prime ministers, and health ministers launch high-profile malaria campaigns. The African Union’s initiative in this regard is much appreciated. We also see the engagement of heads of state in countries that have no malaria within their borders, for example, some of the northern African countries. Malaria control has entered the realm of foreign policy (Chan 2007). African Malaria Day is commemorated on 25 April every year. It has been set aside by African governments committed to RBM and meeting the United Nations malaria-related Millennium Development Goals. It is an opportunity for the RBM partnership to show solidarity with African countries battling against this scourge by supporting several events and activities around the world (PSI: Rwanda—Partnership for Africa Malaria Day. http://www.psi.org/malaria/rwanda-amd07.html).

The African Summit on RBM that was held in Abuja on the 25th of April 2000 reflected a real convergence of political momentum, institutional synergy and technical consensus on malaria. Forty four of the fifty affected countries in Africa attended the summit (The African Summit on Roll Back Malaria http://www.rbm.who.int/docs/abuja_declaration_final.htm). The RBM indicators designate that 80 per cent of the at-risk populations should have insecticide-treated net coverage by 2010. This is possible when an appropriate strategy is employed.

Omona (2009) indicates that there is growing concern in the entire world on malaria, because it is one of the leading global health risks. This is succinctly expressed in the UN Millennium Development Goal six - Combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. The target for malaria as stated in this goal is to have it halted by 2015 and begin to reverse the incidence and related diseases altogether. A growing awareness of malaria’s heavy toll has been matched with greater commitment to curtail it. Increased financial flows from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World Bank’s Global Strategy and Booster Program, the Clinton Global Malaria Initiative and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, among others, have spurred key malaria control interventions, particularly ITNs use and access to effective anti-malarial drugs (UN 2006). On 27 November 2007, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the World’s largest international financer of the fight against malaria, announced that the programs it supports had delivered 46 million bed nets to families at risk of contracting malaria so far in 2007, a 155 per cent increase over the 18 million delivered in 2006 (http://www.psi.org/news/1207d.html).
and curative health services. The health focus is one of the strategies of accumulating human resources for economic development and also one of the strategies of enhancing human-kind’s capability for development purposes. Investment in human capital is the most widely accepted way of improving the asset base of the poor. Studies have indicated that a close association exists between health and agricultural labour earnings and education and higher earnings from non-agricultural activities (Klugman 2002). This may justify investment in good health in developing economies. Uganda is a partner in all Africa related malaria initiatives and has invested over the years in rolling back malaria.

Rationale for Emphasis on Malaria and Mosquito Nets in Uganda

Without effective treatment, malaria can kill a child within 24 hours. Although Uganda has adopted the WHO recommended Artemisinin-based Combination Therapies (ACTs) as first line treatment, the medicines are 10–40 times the price of ineffective treatments such as Chloroquine, and remain too expensive or unavailable in the private and non-profit sectors where more than 50per cent of anti-malarial treatments are obtained (http://web.worldbank.org).

Recently published studies show that a combined program of bed nets and treatment can reduce transmission by as much as 90 per cent in areas with high coverage rates (http://www.psi.org/news/1207d.html). Since ITNs kill mosquitoes, they also help reduce malaria transmission community-wide (http://www.psi.org/news/1207d.html). ITNs are amongst the most effective tools for prevention of malaria. Unfortunately in Uganda, the use of treated nets is still limited. For example, a 2000/1 study estimated that only 13 per cent of the Ugandan households had a mosquito net whereas only 8 per cent of children under five usually slept under one (UBOS 2000/1). In 2005, government abolished taxes on mosquito nets in an effort to make protection against malaria more affordable to the people (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development-Uganda 2004) and consequently, the Uganda National Housing Survey statistics of 2005/6 showed the proportion of people sleeping under mosquito nets increased to 16.8 per cent. These figures may not be different from that of other sub-Saharan African countries.

Malaria, Malaria Policy and Stakeholders in Uganda

Uganda Malaria Indicator Survey (UMIS) (UBOS and ICF Micro 2010) reports that malaria remains one of the most important diseases in Uganda, causing significant morbidity and mortality, and economic loss. It is the second biggest killer disease in the country (UHCR 2004). In the said report, it is noted that children under age five and pregnant women are disproportionately affected. Hospital records suggest that malaria is responsible for 30–50 per cent of outpatient visits, 15–20 per cent of admissions, and 9–14 per cent of inpatient deaths. The 2008 World Malaria Report ranks Uganda 6th worldwide in number of malaria cases and 3rd in number of malaria deaths (World Health Organisation 2008). The overall malaria specific mortality is estimated to be between 70,000 and 100,000 child deaths annually in Uganda, a death toll that far exceeds that for HIV/AIDS (Lynch et al. 2005).

UBOS and ICF Micro (2010) state that Uganda has stable perennial malaria transmission in 90 to 95 per cent of the country. In the rest of the country, particularly in the highland areas, there is low and unstable transmission, with potential for epidemics. The areas of stable transmission

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2 Uganda Malaria Indicator Survey (UMIS-2009) was a national survey conducted by the Ministry of health and sponsored by WHO, USAID, UBOS (Uganda Bureau of Statistics).
are divided into three epidemiological zones: 1) areas of high transmissions levels with more than 100 infective bites per person per year (70 per cent of the country); 2) areas with medium to high transmission levels with 10–100 infective bites per person per year (20 per cent of the country), and 3) areas of low transmission with fewer than 10 infective bites per person per year (10 per cent of the country). Generally, transmission of malaria is highest following the rainy season.

It is indicated in the same report that all four human Plasmodia co-exist in Uganda: however, Plasmodium falciparum is by far the most common, responsible for 90–98 per cent of diagnosed cases and the most common cause of severe malaria. Plasmodium malariae contributes to about 1–3 per cent of all malaria cases. Others present are Plasmodium vivax and Plasmodium ovale. Anopheles gambiae and Anopheles funestus are the most common malaria vectors in Uganda-species that are known to be endophagic and endophilic, that is, they bite and rest indoors, respectively.

The Uganda government, through the Uganda National Malaria Control Program (NMCP), which was started in 1995, is implementing the Uganda Malaria Control Strategic Plan (UMCSP) 2005/6–2009/10. This plan details national prevention and control strategies that include: Use of long-lasting insecticides nets (LLINs); Indoor residual spraying (IRS); environmental management (where feasible and effective); uncomplicated malaria case management with artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) at the community level and in health units (with emphasis on improved diagnosis and management of severe malaria); treatment and prevention of malaria during pregnancy, including intermittent preventive treatment (IPT); early detection and response to malaria epidemics.

Major national prevention activities include distribution of LLINs, IRS, and changes to the recommended diagnostic and treatment regimes. About 6 million LLINs had been distributed before the UMIS data collection. National IRS coverage has focused on epidemic-prone areas, including geographically vulnerable populations and those in internally displaced persons camps in northern Uganda. In 2006, the Ugandan government rolled out a new case management policy in which the recommended first line of treatment was changed from chloroquine plus Fansidar (CQ + SP) to artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT), which was deemed more efficacious and cost-effective. In addition, a home-based management of fever (HBMF) strategy was rolled out nationwide. Unfortunately, the sustainability of HBMF suffered due to inadequate ACT supplies at the community level following the suspension of the Global Fund grant for Round IV Phase II (UBOS and ICF Macro. 2010).

In the same report, it is indicated that many partners to government are involved in the fight against malaria in Uganda—from local to global levels. The public sector, private not-for-profit sector, and private for-profit sector comprise the formal health care system. There is a fairly large informal health care sector including traditional medicine providers, medicine vendors and shops, and complementary and alternative practitioners.

Theoretical and Practical Issues on Malaria and Social Marketing

Malaria

The malaria parasite requires specific human and mosquito tissues to complete its life cycle. Once inside a human, the parasite develops and multiplies, causing periodic bouts of flu-like symptoms, including fever, headache, and chills. Malaria can kill by infecting and
destroying red blood cells (anaemia) and by clogging the capillaries that carry blood to the brain (cerebral malaria) or other vital organs. The deadliest of the four species of the parasite is *Plasmodium falciparum*, a species most likely to be transmitted by the mosquito *Anopheles gambiae*. The genomes of humans, *A. gambiae*, and *P. falciparum* have recently been sequenced, and hopefully this information will point the way to new avenues of vaccination, treatment, or eradication of this disease (http://wwwsummansinc.com/scienceinfocus/sif_malaria.html).

Malaria parasite enters the human host when an infected Anopheles mosquito takes a blood meal (ibid). Inside the human host, the parasite undergoes a series of changes as part of its complex life-cycle. Its various stages allow plasmodia to evade the immune system, infect the liver and red blood cells, and finally develop into a form that is able to infect a mosquito again when it bites an infected person. Inside the mosquito, the parasite matures until it reaches the sexual stage where it can again infect a human host when the mosquito takes her next blood meal, 10 to 14 or more days later. Malaria symptoms appear about 9 to 14 days after the infectious mosquito bite, although this varies with species. If drugs are not available for treatment or the parasites are resistant to them, the infection can progress to become life-threatening.

Malaria parasites are developing unacceptable levels of resistance to one drug after another and many insecticides are no longer useful against mosquitoes transmitting the disease. Resistance of *Plasmodium falciparum* to chloroquin, the cheapest and the most used drug, is spreading in almost all endemic countries. Resistance to the combination of sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine which was already present in South America and South East Asia is now emerging in East Africa. The problem of antimalarial drug resistance is aggravated by the existence of cross resistance among drugs belonging to the same chemical family (http://www.who.int/drugresistance/malaria/en/). Years of vaccine research have produced few hopeful candidates and although scientists are redoubling the search, an effective vaccine is at best years away. Despite the dim future, the work of Ramazani et al (2010) provides some hope. They conducted a study on ten selected plants in Iran to identify new anti-malarial drug target due to the increasing drug resistance to malaria parasites. The findings were that three species: *Boerhavia elegans* (Choisy), *Solanum surattense* (Burm.f.) and *Prosopis juliflora* (Sw.) showed promising anti-plasmodial activity in vitro (IC50 ≤50μg/ml) and in vivo with no toxicity. The dichloromethane fraction of the three extracts revealed stronger anti-plasmodial activity than the total extracts. This is good news for all stakeholders.

Science still has no magic bullet for malaria and many of them doubt that any single solution will ever exist. Nevertheless, effective low-cost strategies are available for its treatment, prevention and control and the RBM global partnership is vigorously promoting them in Africa and other malaria-endemic regions of the world. Prevention of malaria in pregnant women, through measures such as intermittent preventive treatment and the use of insecticide-treated nets (ITNs), results in improvement in maternal health, infant health and survival. Prompt access to treatment with effective up-to-date medicines, such as ACTs, saves lives. If countries can apply these and other measures on a wide scale and monitor them, then the burden of malaria will be significantly reduced (http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/cmc_upload/0/000/015/372/RBMInfosheet_1.htm).

**Fragility of Malaria Control**

While progress in reducing the burden of malaria has been remarkable the world over, resurgences in cases were observed in parts of at least three African countries— Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zambia. The reasons for these resurgences are not known but this illustrates the fragility of malaria control and the need to
The number of deaths due to malaria is estimated to have decreased from 985,000 in 2000 to 781,000 in 2009. Decreases in malaria deaths have been observed in all WHO regions, with the largest proportional decreases noted in the European Region, followed by the Region of the Americas. The largest absolute decreases in deaths were observed in Africa (ibid.).

**Work Remains to Attain Targets**

While considerable global progress has been made, much work remains in order to attain international targets for malaria control. Financial disbursements reached their highest ever levels in 2009 at US$ 1.5 billion, but new commitments for malaria control appear to have levelled-off in 2010, at US$ 1.8 billion. The amounts committed to malaria, while substantial, still fall short of the resources required for malaria control, estimated at more than US$ 6 billion for the year 2010 (WHO 2010).

In 2010, more African households (42 per cent) owned at least one ITN, and more children under five years of age were using an ITN (35 per cent) compared to previous years. Household ITN ownership reached more than 50 per cent in 19 African countries. The percentage of children using ITNs is still below the World Health Assembly target of 80 per cent, partly because up to the end of 2009, ITN ownership remained low in some of the largest African countries (ibid.).

The proportion of reported cases in Africa confirmed with a diagnostic test has risen substantially from less than 5 per cent at the beginning of the decade to approximately 35 per cent in 2009, but low rates persist in the majority of African countries and in a minority of countries in other regions (ibid.).

By the end of 2009, eleven African countries were providing sufficient courses of ACTs to cover more than 100 per cent of malaria cases seen in the public sector; a further 5 African countries delivered sufficient courses to treat 50–100 per cent of cases. These figures represent a substantial increase since 2005, when only five countries were providing sufficient courses of ACT to cover more than 50 per cent of patients treated in the public sector (ibid.).

Social Marketing: Theoretical and Practical Background

Social marketing was “born” as a discipline in the 1970s, when Philip Kotler and Gerald Zaltman realized that the same marketing principles that were being used to sell products to consumers could be used to “sell” ideas, attitudes and behaviours. Kotler and Andreasen define social marketing as “differing from other areas of marketing only with respect to the objectives of the marketer and his or her organization. Social marketing seeks to influence social behaviours not to benefit the marketer, but to benefit the target audience and the general society.” This technique has been used extensively in international health programs the world over.

Like commercial marketing, the primary focus is on learning what people want and need rather than trying to persuade them to buy what we happen to be producing. Marketing talks to the consumer, not about the product. The planning process takes this consumer focus into account by addressing the elements of the “marketing mix.” This refers to decisions about: 1) the conception of a product, 2) price, 3) distribution (place), and 4) promotion. These are often called the “Four Ps” of marketing. Social marketing also adds a few more “P’s.”

**Additional Social Marketing “P’s”** (http://www.social-marketing.com/whatis.html)

**Publics:** Social marketers often have many different audiences that their program has to address in order to be successful. “Publics” refers
to both the external and internal groups involved in the program. External publics include the target audience, secondary audiences, policymakers, and gatekeepers, while the internal publics are those who are involved in some way with either approval or implementation of the program.

**Partnership:** Social and health issues are often so complex that one agency can’t make a dent by itself. You need to team up with other organizations in the community with similar goals to really be effective.

**Policy:** Social marketing programs can do well in motivating individual behaviour change, but that is difficult to sustain unless the environment they’re in supports that change for the long run. Often, policy change is needed in this regard.

**Purse Strings:** Most organizations that develop successful social marketing programs should operate through funds from different but reliable sources. An effective social marketing strategy should have a good mix of all the ‘Ps’.

**Theories that Inform Social Marketing**

**The Health Belief Model (HBM)** (Strecher and Rosenstock 1997; Janz and Becker 1984; Lefebvre 2000) is widely used theory among public health practitioners. The model tries to explain why people may not participate in programs to prevent or detect disease. The establishment of the causes should provide the premise for intervention through social marketing. Two key tenets that can influence participation are perceived benefits and barriers to participation. Such a barrier could be the lack of product on the market or the high price on the open market.

Other theories include Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Montano, Kaspryzk and Taplin 1997; Sutton, Balch and Lefebvre 1995) and its extension, the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). TPB organizes itself around the constructs and behavioural and normative beliefs, attitudes, intentions and behaviours which social marketing targets for positive behavioural change. This theory also emphasises practitioners to identify behavioural outcomes, referents, and facilitators and constraints that are relevant to particular behaviour and population. To a great extent and just like the previous theory, the key constraint in the context of developing countries is the poverty that negatively impacts on the communities, to the extent of having them make marginal move to address health related issues. Promotion of the product plays a key role here.

**The Social Cognitive Theory (SCT):** This explains behaviour in terms of triadic reciprocity (reciprocal determinism) in which behaviour, cognitive and other interpersonal factors, and environmental events all operate as interacting determinants of each other. In contrast to the previous theoretical models, SCT explicitly recognizes that behaviour is not determined by just intrinsic factors, or that an individual is a product of their environment, but that he/she has an influence on what they do, their personal characteristics, how they respond to their environment, and indeed, what environment is. Changes in any of these three factors are hypothesized to render changes in the others. SCT is viewed as one of the more comprehensive efforts to explain human behaviours (Baranowski, Perry and Perce 1997). Its focus on reciprocal determinism and self-efficacy give social marketers a strong theoretical base from which to launch environmental interventions that complement individually focused ones. The theory also underlies many attempts to model new behaviours for a target audience, and that attention, retention, production and motivational processes must all be addressed for effective learning and performing of new behaviours. This is why, for instance, social marketing should attempt to focus on advertisement and distributional strategies (place) that aimed at retention and attracting the attention of the target population.

**The Trans-theoretical Model of Health Behaviour Change:** This model, known as the stages of change, has become one of the more
often used models in social marketing programs. The model identities stages of moving people to attain desired level of behaviour change, namely contemplation, preparation, action, maintenance and termination in that order (Prochaska and Velicer 1997). Other concepts in the model include decision balance (weighing the pros and cons of changing), self-efficacy, and temptation (the role of negative effect or emotional distress, positive social situations and craving). What the model attempts to drive home to social marketers is that relatively few members of a target audience (publics) are ready for action-oriented programs, and that more time and energy needs to be directed to moving people out of the earlier stages in which they are stuck through attention to other processes (e.g. consciousness raising, social liberation). The implication for social marketers is that as the target population is moved through the stages, research shows that the “pros” and “cons” for health behaviours must change and the pros must change as twice as the cons. This can also be achieved when there are appropriate intervention strategies, e.g. partnership; effect; effectiveness of information dissemination (promotion) and removal of obstacle to service access, e.g. purse.

What is evident from these theories is that social marketing should remove barriers to access to health services, create awareness and motivate the target population to receive services. It should help to create an appropriate strategy for intervention. It should also be acknowledged that social marketing theories are more complex than the aforementioned scenario. Not all dimensions are included herein.

Practical Background

In a research on the use of ITNs as a result of using social marketing as a strategy in Pakistan, Qazi and Shaikh (2007) concluded that social marketing could be an effective strategy for getting ITNs to poor communities vulnerable to malaria. The same research established that in the face of growing drug resistance cases in treating malaria, more practical intervention measures such as ITNs are essential. They argued that ITNs are an important cost-effective means to deliver health products and services to low income people and to motivate them to use these services. However, the research was not clear on the issues of coverage and cost-effectiveness from the users’ point of view.

In a research conducted to compare the cost-effectiveness between ITNs and residual house spraying in South Africa, Kwa Zulu Natal, it was found that ITNs are significantly more effective in preventing malaria than is residual spraying (Goodman et al. 2001). Mnzava et al (2001) reported more quantitative findings on the same research and found that ITNs significantly reduced malaria incidence both in 1997 ((Rate Ratio (RR) 0.879, 95per cent Confidence Interval (CI) (0.80–0.95, P= 0.04) and in 1998 (RR= 0.667, CI= 0.61–0.72 and P= 0.0001)). However, the researchers argued that they could not draw an authoritative conclusion that ITNs should replace residual spraying because more data on efficacy, long-term acceptability and cost of intervention needed to be available.

In yet another study in Tanzania to assess the cost-effectiveness and consequences of social marketing approach to malaria control in children by means of ITNs, it was established that social marketing approach to the distribution of ITNs was estimated to cost 1560 US $ per death averted and 57 US $ per disability-adjusted life year averted. These figures fell to 1018 US $ and 37 US $ respectively when costs and consequences of untreated nets were taken into account (Hanson et al 2003). The research concluded that ITNs is an attractive intervention for preventing childhood deaths to malaria. As we can see, the focus was only on childhood but one wonders what the findings would be in an area where malaria incidence has reached an epidemic proportion and when coverage and no segmentation are to be factored in.

Kikumbih et al (2005) conducted a research on social marketing in Kilombero and Ulanga districts of Tanzania on ITN Project and sought
Social Marketing in Respect of ITNs in Uganda

Social marketing is one of the strategies in Uganda for distributing ITNs. This strategy of late has gained wide coverage and is being championed by Population Services International (PSI). PSI is a non-profit organization established in 1970 that delivers products and services to improve health and save lives in the fields of malaria and other public health priority areas. It supports Ministries of Health in 70 countries across the world, including in Uganda.

PSI is an active partner in prompting the use of ITNs through social marketing as a practical and sustainable strategy to improving the health and social conditions of poor and vulnerable peoples in Uganda. They believe that this is a behaviour change program that ensures that the ITNs are available, accessible and affordable to the vulnerable communities. PSI tailors its malaria control programs to the unique environment in each country and the needs of the Ministry of Health and local RBM partnership with the objective of achieving the Abuja targets. It attempts to ensure that the most effective prevention and treatment products are accessible to all, but especially vulnerable groups, through combination of strategies which segment the total market (i.e. applying specific delivery models to population groupings segmented using a series of variables e.g. risks, access, socio-economic status, etc). PSI target groups are the children under five years and pregnant women. It targets subsidized ITNs for the most vulnerable and combines this with stimulating the commercial sector using a range of supply and demand side incentives which attempt to maximize efficient and sustained product delivery (http://www.psi.org/malaria/about-psi-malaria.htm).

They believe that their ITNs are sold at low prices, often affordable to the poor. The logic for the sale of the ITNs is primarily based on the common social marketing principle that when the ITNs are given freely, the recipients often do not value them or even use them. They also reason that since PSI is a non-profit organization, it re-invests all the revenues back into its programs, thus reducing the financial burden on donors.

Due to PSI seemingly impressive intervention in this sector, it has won some recognition worldwide. For example, it has been ranked as a top U.S. Charity by GiveWell (http://www.givewell.net/cause1). In its evaluation of more than 50 non-profit organizations in U.S, GiveWell found that PSI saves a life for every $250–$1,000 it spends, a roughly 3–4 times as good as other strong charities. They further commented that, amongst the organizations evaluated, PSI had the most strategic, systematic, well-documented approach and its programs were among the most cost-effective. PSI simultaneously runs programs that appear as cost-effective and well monitored as anyone else’s and impresses them in terms of its rigorous self-documentation, commitment to transparency, and coherent overall strategy.

Apart from receiving the above award, PSI also reportedly received the whimsical “2007...
However, the use of mosquito nets by children under age five is still inadequate (UBOS 2010). Forty-one per cent of children under five in all households were reported to have slept under any net the night before the survey, while 33 per cent slept under an ITN, and 32 per cent slept under an LLIN. Among children living in households that own an LLIN, however, 59 per cent reported that they slept under an LLIN the night before the survey. Although the data do not show a clear trend or pattern in net usage by age or sex of the child, or by urban-rural residence, they suggest that children under one year of age are slightly more likely than older children to sleep under any mosquito net.

In respect to women, the same report indicates that 42 per cent of all women reported that they slept under any net the night before the survey, and 33 per cent of all women reported that they slept under an ITN the night before the survey. Among women in households with an LLIN, 62 per cent reported that they slept under an LLIN the night before. Among pregnant women in the 15–49 years of age, 44 per cent reported that they slept under any net the previous night; 44 per cent reported that they slept under an ITN. Among pregnant women living in households with an LLIN, 77 per cent reported that they slept under an LLIN the previous night.

Various reasons were given for not using a mosquito net. Amongst them were that net was not hung the previous night; it was too hot and that it had too many holes. It is worth noting that all malaria preventive interventions in Uganda, including the use of ITNs, have resulted in reduction in malaria cases in many districts where the prevalence has been high, for example, Bushenyi, Rukungiri, Mayuge and the Internally Displaced People (IDPs) camps in northern Uganda (LQAS 2006).

The outcome of intervention by PSI and other partners in the fight against malaria using ITNs can be summarized as in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of key malaria indicators in Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Base line (2006 DHS) (%)</th>
<th>2009 UMIS Results (%)</th>
<th>Strategic Plan targets 2010 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Households that own at least one ITN</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households that own at least two ITNs</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households that own three or more ITNs</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under age five sleeping under an ITN the previous night</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pregnant women sleeping under an ITN the previous night</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under five malaria prevalence (by microscopy)</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pregnant women who received IPT during last pregnancy</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Adapted from UBOS and ICF Macro (2010 Report).

na = not available

What should be observed from the status and pattern of ITNs in Uganda is that it has been influenced by social marketing, pioneered by PSI. Though the precise impact of social marketing of ITNs by PSI need to be determined by another form of research, this cannot be wholly factored out.

Discussion, Recommendations and Conclusion

Despite impressive achievements in the fight against malaria in Uganda on the basis of some good social marketing principles such as operating within the policy, partnerships, promotion and purse, this paper submits that two aspects of social marketing currently adopted by PSI are inappropriate to effectively address the malaria pandemic in Uganda. These are the charging of a price for the ITNs and focusing on a segment of the community such as the children under five and pregnant women only, ignoring the bulk of the community. Uganda is a poor country, with high poverty indicators for example, 7.1 million people (constituting about 31 per cent of the population) are living in absolute poverty; the poverty gap is 9 by 2006 and the share of poorest quintile in total household consumption is 6.4 per cent. The Gini-coefficient increased from 0.365 in 1993 to 0.408 in 2006 (UBOS 2010; MFPED 2010). All these suggest that a majority of the population cannot afford to spend money on ITN however cheap it is, because the priority would be on the basics of life. Moreover, with the epidemic in which everybody is prone to be infected, segmenting the provision of the ITN is no good solution. The strategy of PSI suggests that, if one is infected with Malaria but is not under five years and not pregnant, he/she would not benefit from ITN! It further suggests that if one is infected, but if he/she cannot afford the subsidized ITN, he/she misses on the service!

Considering the Abuja declaration and other social policies that enhance access and promote equity in this regard, social marketing is inappropriate for Uganda. This submission supports the views earlier expressed by Professors Jeffrey Sachs and Chris Curtis who dismissed social marketing of Long Lasting Insecticidal Nets (LLINs) as a false economy because it limits subsidized sales of bed nets, to vulnerable groups such as those under five and pregnant women. They also rightly insist that by relying on too narrow a definition of who the vulnerable are, social marketing miss on an opportunity to reduce the incidence of malaria in older children and adults other than pregnant women, and to achieve full community coverage which causes major reduction in the infective mosquito population in the areas (http://www.News-Meduical.net/?id=26876).
Theoretically, it is implied in its implementation strategies that, PSI applies many elements of social marketing theories and models, but it appears the key components of pricing and segmentation limit access. Yet, some social marketing protagonists contend that if price (money or otherwise) is the barrier, it should be got rid of (make it free) (http://www.socialmarketing.blogs.com).

It can be argued that considering all key interventions, both preventive and curative to control malaria in Uganda, the programs have missed achieving the national, the Abuja, and Roll Back Malaria in Africa targets for 2010. This is partly because social marketing, amongst other strategies, is inappropriate for Uganda because the entire country is vulnerable and is in dire need of appropriate intervention that should enhance coverage and access to ITNs. This paper argues that given the high incidence of malaria in Uganda, and the corresponding poverty level, equity should be the only criteria for the distribution of ITNs. We advocate for strict equality, where all members of the community are entitled to benefit freely from the ITNs as opposed to targeting of the vulnerable people under the social marketing model. Strict equality will not only increase coverage but will go a long way in ensuring equality in access to the ITNs, which under the current social marketing strategy is being accessed by those who can afford. It is only by adopting free ITNs and indiscriminate approaches in Uganda that malaria can be effectively fought.

The Minnesota International Health Volunteers effort of giving free ITNs to pregnant women and children under five in West Nile and Karamoja regions of Uganda (Okello 2008) is a step in the direction which should be emulated by other partners, though they fall short of a comprehensive strategy by narrowing focus on specific community members. PSI’s efforts in the fight against malaria are commendable, but it would have a greater impact if the two contentious approaches were effectively addressed. To recover the cost of marketing the ITNs, instead of charging the beneficiaries, Andreasen (2006) suggests that PSI could do the following.

- Partner with Uganda government to cover the cost of intervention. This will also ensure that PSI intervention is within the health policies and priority disease management and prevention programs.
- Strengthen partnership with NGOs and private sector to provide universal coverage and access with built-in complementarity, consistency and continuum of care. This will not only ensure allocation of necessary resources and facilitate collaboration of all members of the health team in the delivery of priority packages, but also will severely cut on the cost of intervention.
- Initiate its own income generating activities. Though it is a non-profit organization, and in order to reduce dependency on donors, it can start making initiatives into this direction. The motive is not to make it a profit-making organization, but it can employ the same principle it is currently using, to plough back whatever profit made to enhancing the access of the poor to the nets.
- Focus upstream to attempt to influence policies and programs relating to ITNs. The politicians, community and local leaders, and CBOs are such targets that can be effectively used to change the behaviour of the vulnerable communities. By operating upstream, PSI should more or less take the role of public relation specialists, lobbyists, community mobilizers and organizational change specialists. In doing so, they have to avoid the “us-versus-them” posture, and show (hypothetical or real) examples of how our way of thinking might be more powerful and effective, and more adaptable.

In addition to these, this paper submits that if malaria is to be rolled back in Uganda, and indeed Africa, all stakeholders should hold on to the following values, some of which were recently echoed by Chan (2007):
• There must be political commitment at the highest level of movements. The commitment should not only be seen in policy initiatives in this regard, but budgeting, implementation and accountability for all the monies spent for this purpose. Uganda government should commit itself to an intensive effort to halve the malaria mortality for Africa’s people by 2015 through implementing strategies and actions as agreed at the Abuja Summit 2000. Key to this is commitment to good governance, exhibited in good leadership style, democratic values, and freedom of speech, justice and having a high sense of nationalism. Ugandan leaders at all levels must re-invent the wheel of good governance. However well-intentioned an intervention is, if the governance atmosphere is unfavourable as in Darfur, Somali, Congo and the Kenya election scandal where more than 600 people died and a quarter of a million displaced as a result of the controversy over the December 27 2007 events when the Kenyan Electoral Commission declared the incumbent Mwai Kibaki the winner, then it will not have any impact on the common people (The Hindu, Saturday, 19, 2008). The recent Uganda elections of February 2011, results of which have been roundly rejected by the opposition and have unanimously called for public protests akin to the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, are evidence of poor governance that can retard any well intentioned policy development (Bareebe 2010) and reverse and positive democratic trajectory.

• Uganda should have ambitious initiatives if it is to effectively reduce mortality from malaria. The national malaria policy should be a clear road map to this effect. It should not segment the target population but rather set the targets of comprehensively providing the services to all the people in all communities. Malaria needs “carpet bombing”, but not selecting of targets if it is to be eradicated by 2015 as per the MDG targets and Abuja targets of 2010.

• Uganda should note that a disease as complex and difficult as malaria is best addressed by a multi-pronged approach, based on sound science. For example, Ethiopia is using community volunteers to make ACTs widely available to the poor, virtually reaching the doorsteps of rural homes. In a mass campaign, almost 20 million long-lasting ITNs have been delivered over the past two years. With government support, more than 30,000 health extension workers have received a full year of training. Uganda can research on such a more cost-effective method of production as is applicable to their context.

• Uganda needs to make good use of what already exists. Its leaders need not be reminded of consequences of ineffective aid, of overlapping and fragmented activities among multiple partners. Many know the burden placed on countries, the high transaction costs, and the frequent failure to align with country priorities and capacities. Accordingly, they could best reach the poor through the use of existing delivery channels. These may be schools or antenatal clinics. Increasingly, immunization campaigns are being used to deliver a package of essential interventions, including treated nets, vitamin A supplements, and de-worming tablets as well as vaccines for measles and polio. Immunization programs generally do the best job of delivering interventions to hard-to-reach populations, and can achieve high population coverage, even in the absence of a well functional health system. Using them for integrated delivery of malaria interventions is a value-added approach that increases operational efficiency while also boosting the benefits for health. These call for a review of the existing local and central government laws, especially those that deal with decentralisation and the attendant challenges.
• For malaria to be effectively controlled, Uganda leaders at all levels are advised never to forget the resourcefulness of communities. In rural parts of Uganda, when community views are assessed, malaria nearly always emerges as the number one priority. Community concern about mutual welfare is powerful social capital that should be tapped. The issue is the commitment and using appropriate social marketing strategies for mobilization and information dissemination.

In conclusion, despite fight against malaria, including the use of social marketing, malaria prevalence is still high in Uganda. The RBM targets of 2010 have not been achieved. The paper agrees with Professors Curtis and Sachs that comprehensive malaria control in Africa generally could be achievable by 2015, at the minimal cost of US$3bn per year if sound principles of public health and economics were observed. Millions of lives can be saved and Africa, including Uganda, will be given vital help in escaping from the vicious circle of poverty and diseases that continue to grip the continent (http://www.lshtm.ac.uk/news/2007/insecticidalbednets.html). Though much effort is being made by the Board of the RBM partnership to develop an Affordable Medicines Facility for malaria (AMFm) (http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS) to improve access to safe, effective and affordable malaria medicines, the target should be to eliminate the cost factor and ensure free distribution of all malaria-related treatment products.

Practitioners, such as PSI need to use multiple social marketing theories and models that fit the Ugandan context, including motivational theories to inform message dissemination, organizational development and business-to-business marketing models to inform coalition and partnership development and management, political theories and agenda-setting research to inform policy initiatives, systems theory to scan the environments of implementation, consumer behaviour to target resources to consumer demand-seeking behaviours, cross-cultural theories to inform international social marketing efforts.

Notes
1 ITNs have been used synonymously with LLINT (Long-Lasting Insecticides Treated Nets).
2 Uganda Malaria Indicator Survey (UMIS-2009) was a national survey conducted by the Ministry of health and sponsored by WHO, USAID, UBOS (Uganda Bureau of Statistics).

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http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/cmc_upload/0/000/015/372/RBMInfosheet_1.htm
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http://web.worldbank.org/WEBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS
Introduction

Education is an important tool for gender equity. Improved female education levels are associated with declining fertility levels, low infant mortality rates and increased female labour force participation. Education for women and girls is critically important not only for harnessing the nation’s human resources for development, but also for raising self esteem and confidence and widening women’s life choices as well as their access to information and knowledge.

Gender mainstreaming refers to the consistent use of gender perspectives at all stages of development and implementation of policies, plans, programmes and projects (Kabonesa 2010). It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (UN ECOSOC 1997). Whilst gender is not synonymous with women, most debates on gender, however, focus on women due to the unequal treatment that women have been subjected to over the years.

Many national, regional and international laws protect the right to education. These include the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development, and the Dakar Framework for Action.

The government of Zimbabwe has committed itself to improving education and literacy levels for both men and women. Zimbabwe’s adult literacy rate of 86 per cent makes it the second highest in the region. However women constitute 60 per cent of the illiterate adult population and the school dropout rate, particularly among female students still remains high (Zimstat 2010). Enrolment at secondary level, universities and vocational training institutions is also significantly lower for females than for males. To narrow this gap, the government has introduced strategies to promote gender equity. These include amending all relevant education and legal instruments to promote gender equality and equity (Government of Zimbabwe 2004).

Women Enrolment in Higher and Tertiary Education

In higher and tertiary education, women constitute almost 40 per cent of the total student population. This figure is much lower than the SADC average of 49.9 per cent, and the MDGs target of 50 per cent. The situation is much worse especially in universities. Female enrolment has slightly increased from 23 per cent in 2006 to 37 per cent in 2007 (see Fig. 1). Female under-representation in university education and polytechnics, and over-representation in teachers’ colleges is a result of gender stereotyped social values and roles. There are more women in primary teachers colleges than in secondary colleges, partly because of the belief that women can deal well with children, especially infants.
All institutions recorded a reduced enrolment of female students when the country was facing economic challenges. At the University of Zimbabwe, campus hostels were closed during this period—resulting in more female students opting out of university. When the hostels were opened in 2011 female students were given the first priority to occupy campus accommodation. Under this policy, females were encouraged to enrol in degree programmes at universities with one or two points fewer than males for the same degree (Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education 2010).

The Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education also gave a policy directive to technical and teachers’ colleges to reserve a certain percentage of vacancies to female candidates. For technical colleges, at least 30 per cent of vacancies are reserved for women whilst at teachers at least 50 per cent of the total enrolment should be women.

Whilst teachers colleges have made strides in achieving this benchmark, critics still argue that teaching was after all a female profession. In polytechnics and vocation colleges, only 35 per cent of students are women.

There are very few women who undertake science and technology subjects. In all universities, all programmes are dominated by male students except for Humanities and Social Sciences at the Zimbabwe Open University and Health Sciences at Bindura University. Though female students dominate Health Sciences at Bindura University, it can be argued that it is because the degree programme offered is a nursing degree which is traditionally a female profession. Generally, there is a low representation of women in science, mathematics and technology. More women take up subjects in the social sciences or non-technical fields while fewer female scholars are enrolled in the natural or pure sciences and technology programmes (see Table 1).
Table 2. Selected universities’ student enrolments by field of study and sex in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of University</th>
<th>Science, Engineering &amp; Technology</th>
<th>Humanities and Social Sciences</th>
<th>Business, Management &amp; Law</th>
<th>Health Sciences</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male (%)</td>
<td>Female (%)</td>
<td>Male (%)</td>
<td>Female (%)</td>
<td>Male (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bindura University</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinhoyi University</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lupane University</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National University of Science and Technology</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands State University</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Zimbabwe</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe Open University</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Southern African Regional Universities Association (SARUA) (2009)

**The Case of the Women’s University in Africa (WUA)**

The Women’s University in Africa is a private institution which focuses on fostering gender equality. The majority of the students are mature women even though it also enrolls a small number of male students (see Fig. 2). The university is a multi-disciplinary institution and seeks to promote gender equity by providing a gender sensitive and socially responsible training. The university is tailor-made to suit the need of those women who could not further their education due to their previous disadvantaged status. These women include those who failed to raise money to advance to A-level, married women with family responsibilities, as well as those who are in full time employment. The university offers flexible learning programs which allow students to attend evening and weekend classes. The University has four faculties and degree programmes, namely: 1) Social Sciences and Gender Development Studies, 2) Agriculture, Management, Entrepreneurial Development, 3) Information Technology and 4) Reproductive Health and Family Sciences. It also offers special programs for IT executives and thematic short courses in agriculture, management and social sciences.
Although the creation of the Women’s University in Africa has availed learning opportunities for females, the dominant areas of specialisation are non-technical programmes such as arts and commerce. Very few women take up science subjects.

**Non-formal Education**

Non-formal education has played a very big role in raising literacy levels. Many women have managed to enrol for non-formal educational courses. This is because women would not have had the opportunity to enrol in formal schools earlier in their lives. While males and females are almost at par in correspondence (Fig. 3), there are more females than males in basic literacy, (73 per cent), functional literacy (75 per cent), and adult education (78 per cent).
Human Resources in the Education Sector

In the education sector the proportion of females is still very low. According to MoESAC (2010) females constitute only 27 per cent of lecturing staff at universities, 36 per cent at polytechnics and 40 per cent at teachers’ training colleges. There are more female primary school teachers than males and more male secondary school teachers than females (see Fig. 4). This is because more female students enrol at primary teachers’ colleges than males.

![Bar chart showing teaching staff by gender in 2009](image)

Figure 4. Teaching Staff by Gender, 2009

SOURCE: MoESAC (2010)

In universities, men constitute the bigger percentage of teaching staff (Table 2). For instance, in Science, Engineering and Technology males range from 58 per cent in Bindura to 90 per cent in Lupane. In Humanities and Social sciences, the proportion of male staff members ranges from 50 per cent at Lupane to 100 per cent at Bindura. In business management and law, male proportions range from 64 per cent at Chinhoyi to 93 per cent at Bindura. In the health sciences, proportions of male staff members range from 14 per cent at ZOU to 100 per cent at Bindura.
Generally, more men than women are employed in the various faculties mainly because of the disparities that start at secondary school level through to higher and tertiary education.

**Conclusion**

Although gender parity has been achieved in primary education, disparities in the higher and tertiary education sector are still marked. These need to be addressed given the pervasive impact of education on all facets of life. Even though the government introduced policies aimed at addressing these disparities, the success of these policies are limited. Societal expectations as well as stereotypical attitudes still weigh down on the advancement of women in the higher education sector. More effort is still needed at policy making level to ensure that higher and tertiary education institutions mainstream gender in their programmes. There is need to train heads of institutions in gender mainstreaming for them to appreciate the need for gender parity. Institutions that specifically deal with addressing gender issues are very few and this deals a blow to efforts to achieve gender parity in education. In addition, women seem not keen to take up opportunities availed through government policy to venture into the male dominated academic fields. There is also a need to promote and encourage girls to take on science, mathematics and technology at all levels of education.

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**Introduction**

One of the most striking features of the globalization of higher education has been the rapid growth in the number of students studying abroad. Globally, the number of students enrolled outside their country of origin doubled from 1.3 million students in 1995 to 3.0 million in 2007 (OECD 2001; UNESCO 2009). A majority of internationally mobile students are in university programmes, with smaller numbers in vocational tertiary programmes, intensive language programmes (especially English) and secondary schools. Ziguras and McBurnie (2010) observe that students from low-income and middle-income countries more often travel abroad for several years to undertake whole academic programmes. Most of the international student mobility in the Asia-Pacific region is of this kind where in the last three decades, growth in this kind of mobility out of Asia has fuelled the development of a global higher education market. In the Philippines, international student mobility is one of the key strategic components of the internationalization of Philippine higher education, also referred to as transnational or cross-border higher education (Angeles 2009).

Recent reports note that the influx of many foreign students in the country who are enrolling in various institutions of learning has been highly noticeable. Questions nonetheless abound to the reasons for this rush. According to a report by Agence France-Presse (AFP), the reasons are not far-fetched; some of the factors are the issues of cheap yet high-quality courses conducted in English and an easy-going lifestyle outside the class (Gutierrez 2011). The news reports observe that with more than 2,100 private and state-run institutions nationwide offering a wide array of courses, and an immigration policy friendly to foreign students, the Philippines is indeed enjoying an enrolment boom (Gutierrez 2011). The results further highlight that the most important factors motivating African students to study in the Philippines are in the order of seeking qualifications with worldwide recognition; the inherent need to broaden personal experience; high quality of education abroad; the perception that studying abroad can enhance future employment prospects and the want to have new experiences. Seeking qualifications with worldwide recognition stand out among the most important factor. Given that sub-Saharan Africa has the highest outbound mobility share of its total higher education population, a number of policy implications arise on marketing the Philippines and/or its academic institutions as a choice for students from sub-Saharan Africa, going beyond the targeted markets currently focused on South East Asia and the Middle East.
Globalization has in effect demanded for the improvement in the quality of education, increases in the quantity of graduates, efficiency in the way institutions are managed and producing graduates and professionals are ready to be hired by internationalized economies and have a global outlook. The country has come to recognize international higher education’s role in augmenting national capacity with focus on a country’s development as it relates with other countries. Survey and analysis of developments of last few decades indicates that globalization, transformation from industrial into global knowledge economy, and international student mobility are mutually reinforcing one another and changing higher education landscape worldwide. Considering all the weaknesses and strengths of Philippine higher education system, the country has nonetheless benefited much on international education and mobility of students in terms of improving the quality of our programs and resources. Student mobility, as part and parcel of internationalization, where students cross borders to receive foreign education, has great implications on the country’s socioeconomic, cultural and political milieu (Angeles 2009).

In this regard, as early as the year 2000, the Philippine government issued Executive Order No. 285 which governs the guidelines on the entry and stay of foreign students in the Philippines and the establishment of an inter-agency committee on foreign students. As globalization has made countries more interdependent, so has higher education been made more open among nations. The issuance of EO 285 was an initial step in promoting the Philippines as a centre for education in Asia, with one plank making it easier for foreign students to apply for visas. It also established exchange programmes between Philippine schools and universities in many countries, including Australia, the United States, South Korea, Canada, and European nations (Gutierrez 2011). The Philippine higher education system is one of the oldest in the region. Its history dates back to the University of Santo Tomas, which was established in 1611. The State-supported University of the Philippines was established in 1908. In fact, the number of universities and colleges in the country is above what is needed— the system has over 1,700 tertiary-level colleges and universities taking care of 2.4 million students (Gonzalez 2006). However, there is insufficient variety to cater to the demands for diverse and advanced fields of study. There are also continuing problems within the system, such as ambiguity with regard to the language of instruction and the overall balance between quantity and quality (Gonzalez 2006).

The internationalization of higher education institutions in the Philippines is a consequence of the continued globalization of economies. Angeles (2009) notes that the staggering number of foreign students across borders can be attributed to processes of globalization. Special visas at the end of the school year in March 2011, while postulating that the number would eventually rise when classes were set to begin in June.

The attraction to the Philippines of foreign students can be traced to as far back as in the 1980s, and this was mostly in specialized fields such as medicine and agriculture (Gutierrez 2011). Following this, decades later there was a marked rise in the number of schools and institutions offering short-term courses in English language, aviation, hotel and restaurant management and maritime-related classes too— factors that aided in further attracting more foreign students to the country (Uchime 2011). Then, in 2000, the government embarked on a strategy to commercially promote the Philippines as a centre for education in Asia, with one plank making it easier for foreign students to apply for visas. It also established exchange programmes between Philippine schools and universities in many countries, including Australia, the United States, South Korea, Canada, and European nations (Gutierrez 2011). The Philippine higher education system is one of the oldest in the region. Its history dates back to the University of Santo Tomas, which was established in 1611. The State-supported University of the Philippines was established in 1908. In fact, the number of universities and colleges in the country is above what is needed— the system has over 1,700 tertiary-level colleges and universities taking care of 2.4 million students (Gonzalez 2006). However, there is insufficient variety to cater to the demands for diverse and advanced fields of study. There are also continuing problems within the system, such as ambiguity with regard to the language of instruction and the overall balance between quantity and quality (Gonzalez 2006).

The internationalization of higher education institutions in the Philippines is a consequence of the continued globalization of economies. Angeles (2009) notes that the staggering number of foreign students across borders can be attributed to processes of globalization.
Philippine higher education landscape which is unusually large composing of 1,741 higher education institutions with an average enrolment of 2.5 million per year, the internationalization of higher education through student mobility will truly facilitate better exchanges of knowledge and skills between the nation and other countries. Hence, CHED is pursuing strategies to strengthen the ties between the Philippines and other countries/economies (Angeles 2009).

Background to the Study

UNESCO (2009) reports that about 5.8% of all tertiary students from the sub-Saharan African region study abroad. This is about three times greater than the global average. One-third or more of tertiary students from the following countries study abroad: Cape Verde (outbound mobility ratio 103%), Botswana (89%), Namibia (61%) and Swaziland (58%). Outbound mobility ratios are also very high in Lesotho (48%), Mauritius (41%), Malawi (31%), Central African Republic (21%), Niger (22%), Senegal (17%), Cameroon (15%) and Kenya (11%). In contrast, the ratio is low in South Africa (0.8%), Nigeria (1.6%) and Ethiopia (2.1%) (ibid). Overall, 7.8% of all mobile students (218,000) are from sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa is a notable exception as a major destination for mobile students, especially for those from the sub-Saharan African region. In 2007, it attracted 2% of all mobile students worldwide. Today, one out of five African mobile students pursues studies in this country. More than one-half (57%) are originally from Namibia and Zimbabwe. With the region being the foremost market in attracting foreign students away from Africa to emerging destinations in the East, North America and Western Europe, however, remain the most popular destinations, attracting 67% of the region’s mobile students (17% and 50% respectively) (UNESCO 2009). In terms of world regions, sub-Saharan Africa has the highest outbound mobility share of its total higher education population (6%), almost three times greater than the world’s average (Bhandari and Laughlin 2009: 5). This is in contrast to North America (USA and Canada) that have the lowest outbound ratio with only 0.4% of the region’s tertiary students pursuing their education abroad. With reference to mobile students from sub Saharan Africa, the percentage by region of destination shows significant growth to East Asia and the Pacific in 2007 (+2.4 relative to 1999) compared to other foreign destinations. It can be noted from the figures that the global share of mobile students from sub-Saharan Africa is indeed significant (UNESCO 2009).

A literature search reveals that a comprehensive study on African student mobility is that by Kishun (n.d.). The author notes that data on the number of African students outside of the continent can be tracked from information provided by agencies like UNESCO, OECD, and Open Doors. Although Kishun (n.d.) cautions that despite the statistics being somewhat imprecise, they nevertheless provide a picture of the extent of the destinations of African students. The 2006 estimates for instance show that the top four sending countries from Africa are Nigeria (15138); Kenya (14123); Senegal (10677); and Botswana (9471). Kishun (n.d.) further observes that one of the striking features of the student mobility on the African continent is its regional character, particularly how inter-country mobility reproduces patterns of colonization. Southern and Eastern Africa tended to have a British colonial influence; West Africa was largely under the influence of France, while Central and North Africa were a scramble between France and Germany. According to Maringe and Carter (2007), African students tend to migrate to countries formerly included as colonies of the same European power as their own, largely because of derived cultural capital, language facility, and a somewhat shared history. Thus, post-colonial associations are a significant influence on international student mobility. There are, of course, exceptions to the colonial pattern, such as Cameroon, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. But France, the region’s single most
important host country, and Belgium are the preferred destinations for Francophone students from Benin, Gabon, Comoros, Congo, DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, and Senegal. Each of these countries sends more than 2,000 students abroad every year. Students from Lusophone countries, such as Angola, Cape Verde, and Mozambique tend to go to Portugal. After South Africa, the United States is the main destination for students from Anglophone Sub-Saharan countries, including Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa, each of which sends more than 1,900 students abroad annually.

Regarding the reasons for the low student mobility out of South Africa, Mpinganjira and Rugimbana (2009) attest that in comparison to other African countries, South Africa appears to have fared differently and is currently the leading exporter of higher educational services in Africa. Whilst much of South Africa’s current appeal is that it was immune to the World Bank policies aimed at other African countries, prior to 1994 policies in the higher education were developed to serve the priorities of the apartheid separate development program with institutions differentiated along racial lines. Since the dawn of democracy in 1994, South Africa has been transforming its higher education sector to rid itself of its apartheid past. According to Schoole (2006), the country’s higher education restructuring process has been largely guided by practices in industrialised countries in an effort to emulate international best practices. This has helped the country to position itself as an ‘African International Students alternative” to studying overseas. Kishun (n.d.) notes that African student mobility patterns show the unusually high level of movement from sub-Saharan countries; the fact that in some countries more students study abroad than at home; and the regional characteristics are all factors that show that students are motivated primarily by socio-economic, political, and other “push factors” and “pull factors” than the desire to obtain an international education. It’s an area for further in-depth studies.

**Review of Related Literature**

**Global Trends in International Student Mobility**

Verbik and Lasanowski (2007) observe that international student mobility has over the past 10–15 years become an increasingly important part of the global higher education landscape. The total number of mobile tertiary education students was estimated to have reached more than 2.7 million in 2005, a nearly 61% increase since 1999 (UNESCO 2006). Traditionally, more than 90% of international students have enrolled in institutions in countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with the main destinations—the US, the UK, Germany, France and Australia—recruiting over 70% of them. Significant year-on-year growth was recorded in the late 1990s and early 2000s in most of the main English-language destinations with major source countries such as China and India providing a large number of enrolments each year. Student’s mobility is still a minority phenomenon in the world’s students population. However, this phenomenon is on a regular growth (Lagrée 2008). The destinations remain located in the preferentially developed Anglophone countries. Student mobility thus remains primarily transcontinental. On the contrary, this tendency is simultaneously showing a regular growth of regional student’s mobility. East Asia and South East Asia, for instance, tend to gradually developing a regional higher education market (Lagréè 2008). This is by no means a recent phenomenon since international student mobility can be traced back to the Middle-Ages in Europe and Asia, where a long tradition has put scholars in search of the best universities or places of knowledge production. Nevertheless, still today, at the turn of the twenty-first century, studying abroad remains the characteristic of only a minority of students since, according to the latest figures released by the UN Statistics Bureau, less than 2% of the overall world student population are enrolled in foreign universities. This minority is only steadily but slowly increasing,
Significant changes in the infrastructures and capacity of higher education systems across the world partially explain why there has been such growth in such a short time. The large majority of national governments have been allocating more funds to higher education to improve the quantity and quality of tertiary education being offered within their borders. Even so, capacity is insufficient to meet demand in the major source countries. At the same time, with higher household levels of wealth and rising GDP per capita, more students from across the world are able to participate in higher education abroad, especially those from countries with rapidly growing economies. The total number of worldwide tertiary enrolments is 40% higher than it was seven years ago, with more people participating in higher education than ever before (Verbik and Lasanowski 2007). Similar studies in trying to understand international student mobility of particular nationalities have been undertaken (Black Expat 2008; Kishun (n.d); Maringe and Carter 2007; de Wit 2008; King, Ahrens, and Findlay 2010; Verbik and Lasanowski 2007). This study is, however, greatly influenced by three specific studies: 1) Lu (2006), who sought to study the mobility of Chinese students at the University of Saskatchewan, Canada, 2) Maringe and Carter (2007) that sought to understand students’ motivation for studying in the United Kingdom’s higher education, and 3) Xiang (2001) on structuration of Indian information technology professionals and migration to Australia.

Statement of the Problem

In the Philippines, higher education institutions have seen substantial increase in the number of foreign students from neighbouring Asian states in the past years. Also, there has been a growing population of African students in the country, reflecting a prospective market. In this regard, the pertinent research question for the study is: “How do factors determining African student mobility affect their trends in seeking higher education and training in the Philippines over the past decade?”
Specific questions in regard to the key research question are:

i. What are the factors that influence decisions of African students to seek higher education and training in the Philippines?

ii. How do the lived-experiences of African students in the Philippines contribute to potential increase in their numbers in the country?

iii. How can agencies involved in higher education and training in the Philippines seek means towards increasing the population of this niche market in contrast to other competing nations?

iv. What lessons can be drawn from the study to inform key stakeholders in higher education and training with regard to the value of strengthening research on international student mobility in the country in general?

**Purpose of the Study**

The study aimed to explore, examine and understand factors that determine African student mobility to the Philippines in respect to seeking higher education and training given emerging trends in international student mobility in Asia over the past decade.

**Methodology**

Given the limited empirical studies done on African student mobility in East Asia, and in the Philippines in particular, this study employed qualitative exploratory and descriptive research designs. Purposive sampling and snowballing or ‘chain referral sampling’ strategies were employed in the study. Snowballing was employed to identify African students from an already identified participant or informant with who contact was already made and use their social networks to refer the researcher to other people who could potentially participate in or contribute to the study. This sampling method yielded a number of “hidden populations,” especially those yet to be formally identified or accessible to the researchers purposively. The study equally employed accidental or haphazard sampling in addition to the two prior mentioned to gather participants based on no formal predetermined rules whatever. The target of this ‘accidental’ sampling was envisaged to be undertaken at the following locations that are frequented by foreign students, including African students. Three data collection procedures were employed for the study: key in-depth interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions, and self-administered questionnaires. Thematic content analysis was undertaken by dividing the main themes underlying the whole research into different sections wherein each was accompanied by a brief description relating to its importance vis-à-vis the research literature and responses taken from the participants or respondents. Data was coded into themes where discussions were categorized thematically in order to come up with the study outcome. This study focused only on African students currently enrolled in higher education and training institutions in Metro Manila and Cavite. Given the relatively small population of African students in the country compared to those from other regions, the research included all possible students of different African nationalities. About 32 African students comprised the purposive samples of respondents for the study. As a preliminary baseline study, the study restricted itself to the locations aforementioned.

**Results**

**African Student Population in the Philippines**

For the period 2004–2011, there were an estimated 1,295 African students in the country. From this estimate, the top three African countries that have a relative substantial number of students in the country are Sudanese being the majority with 345 (26%) students, followed by Nigeria with 246 (19%) and Kenya with 179 (14%) students. The remaining six source
Factors that Influence Decisions of African Students to Seek Higher Education and Training in the Philippines

The results of the study highlight that important factors influencing the choice of African students studying in the Philippines are in the order of seeking qualifications with worldwide recognition; the inherent need to broaden personal experience; high quality of education abroad; the perception that studying abroad can enhance future employment prospects; and the want to have new experiences. Seeking qualifications with worldwide recognition stands out among the most important factors. It is also worth noting that included in the most important factors are a mix of factors to do with both the quality of education on offer, i.e. the academic side and also factors associated with the experience side of studying abroad.
For example, many students felt that studying in Asia offers them opportunities to broaden their personal experiences and offers as well a springboard to other destinations, notably to traditional destinations like the USA, Canada and Europe.

**Understanding the Lived-Experiences of African Students in the Philippines and Identifying the Positive and Negative Feedback from These Students**

To enhance their lived experiences, African students in the Philippines have established support strategies that consider all aspects of their engagement with their new environment, especially where they are in substantial numbers. The establishment of student associations helps in identifying roles and cultural benefits, as students find these structures more accessible and less-threatening than other formal support structures. These structures also produce more meaningful learning outcomes for the new international student. Like the African Student Association of the Adventist University of the Philippines, these groups impart information to new international students through informal means and relationships where the outcome can be meaningful and personal learning experience enhanced for the new student in the country. Institutional support systems equally assist in enhancing such experiences though this is general for all international students in the institution enrolled in and not necessarily cultural or country of origin. In application to African students in the Philippines, there may be need for the following enhancing strategies.

**Strategies on How Agencies Involved in Higher Education and Training in the Philippines Can Seek Better Means Towards Increasing the Population of African Students in the Country**

Results of the study attested that the Philippines accords certain advantages towards attracting African students as part of the market driven by the internationalization of higher education. Of particular advantage is the American standard of education availed, quality of in-demand courses such as electronics and communications, flexible and friendly immigration requirements, reduced felt racisms or ethno-racial stereotyping [as noted to be in China], and general aesthetics living in the country compared to other destinations, such as those in the Middle East. Studies also show that it is more affordable to study in the Philippines compared with other countries offering high quality education. It can, however, be presumed that with the lack of formal educational promotion programs in Africa by the Philippines, informal referrals are the main mediums of promoting study in the Philippines. The most influential people in their lives do suggest study in the Philippines primarily because they have already experienced being there in the first place. Other than that, friends who have already experienced travelling and studying to the Philippines have suggested choosing the Philippines as a travel destination and for higher education and learning. In addition to that, other means of recommending African students study in the Philippines is via schools and/or people with connections to the higher education institutions in the country [informal links, affiliations such as faith-based institutions, and Alumni]. It follows therefore that continued success in recruiting and retaining international students will depend on the ability of the country and its institutions to understand and provide for the needs and wants of the mobile student market especially from a niche market as that from the sub Saharan Africa.

**Lessons from the Study Relevant to Key Stakeholders in Higher Education and Training with Regard to the Value of Enhancing Research on International Student Mobility in the Country**

Efforts aimed at improving the quality of educational services on offer would go a long way in ensuring that strategies aimed at attracting more international students from Africa as a measure towards reducing the problem of brain drain [through exchange programs notably South-South cooperation] is successfully addressed. Players in these efforts, be it governments,
institutions of higher education, or individuals working in the sector, need to bear in mind that they are part of a competitive global market of institutions attracting international students from all parts of the globe. Key lessons from the study with regard to attracting a potential large African market are based on the premises that: quality improvements need to take into consideration internationally accepted quality standards in teaching, research, facilities and other support services on offer to students; the ultimate aim is to ensure that a hosting country and institution is able to provide international students irrespective of their origin not only with good quality academic qualifications but also to ensure that their overall experience during their stay in the country is rated favourably. International students who have had a good time in a country and/or an institution are likely to talk well of the country/institution and can thus be a valuable marketing resource for the country/institution. The study indeed raises initial awareness to key government agencies and accrediting bodies regarding the presence and needs of African students in the country away from the traditional student target sources such as that from South Korea, China and India. This attention is deemed not only beneficial to specific education-related agencies but to the country as a whole by improving the educational system to meet set international standards and therefore make the Philippines competitive with the rest of the world in attracting diverse international students.

Conclusion
In conclusion, this study offers initial investigative information on the factors affecting the choices of African students in their preference to study in the Philippines. However, a full account of their extent and makeup has been limited, given that few empirical studies are done on them and there is lack of updated data. For the Philippines, the top three African countries with a relatively substantial number of students in the country are Sudanese being the majority, followed by Nigerians and Kenyans. Other notable source countries of African students include Eritrea, Ghana, Ethiopia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Tanzania. Other African students in the country worth mentioning include Tanzanians, Angolans, Cameroonians, Zambians, Egyptians, Congolese and Ugandans. The concentration of this population is mainly in Manila, Cebu, Davao and Baguio. This result to some extent contradicts the belief that African students tend to migrate to countries formerly included as colonies of the same European power as their own, largely because of derived cultural capital and language facility which create a somewhat shared sense. As noted in the literature, mobility to the Philippines among African students does not necessarily follow nor does it reproduce patterns of western colonization. This pattern is synonymous with that portrayed by Sugimura (2008) which shows that student mobility around the world is no longer a linear process as it was in the early years of the 20th century, but one that is more multi-dimensional and where, as a consequence, there are a variety of mobility routes. It can be inferred that with the lack of formal educational promotion programs in Africa by the Philippines, informal referrals are the main mediums of promoting study in the Philippines. The most influential people in their lives do suggest study in the Philippines primarily because they have already experienced being there in the first place. Other than that, friends who have already experienced travelling and studying to the Philippines have suggested choosing the Philippines as a travel destination and for higher education and learning. In addition to that, other means of recommending African students study in the Philippines is via schools and/or people with connections to the higher education institutions in the country [informal links, affiliations such as faith based institutions, and Alumni]. In agreement with Bernardo (2002), the prospects for improving the consequences of internationalizing Philippine higher education, specifically to a niche market such as those from sub Saharan Africa, amidst the competitive globalizing environment, will depend on the prospects for (a) strengthening the quality and
the efficiency of Philippine higher education, (b) improving access to quality higher education, and (c) creating the external environment that will be conducive to and supportive of international education activities.

References


Reconstructing a Fragile State of Somalia: Drivers, Dynamics, and Impact of Neighbouring Countries

Abdihakim Aynte

Summary

It has become a common claim that the gravest dangers to world security are no longer military threats from rival great powers, but rather transnational threats emanating from poorly governed countries. Somalia’s civil war began long before the state collapsed in 1991. On January 26th, 1991, Somalis everywhere received with jubilation the news of President Siad Barre’s ouster because they thought that was the end of dictatorial leadership. However, since the fall of Siad Barre’s government in January 1991, there has been no permanent and stable national government in Somalia including the current Transitional Federal Government.

Somalia records the largest number of unsuccessful peace agreements anywhere from 1991 to 2009. For over 18 years Somalia has been in search of sustainable peace that in all practical purposes has been elusive. There have been 13 attempts including: Djibouti National Reconciliation in 1991, Addis Ababa Agreement in Ethiopia in 1993, Somali National Reconciliation Conference held in Kenya in 2004, Khartoum Reconciliation in Sudan in 2006, National Reconciliation Congress in Somalia in 2007 and Djibouti Agreement in 2008 that resulted to Shariff Sheikh Shariff being elected as the Transitional Federal Government president in Djibouti in 2008 after the resignation of President Abdullahi Yusuf.

Without understanding the root cause of the problems of fragile state, it would be impossible and unattainable ambition for international actors to rebuild Somalia. The research is therefore intended to find out the drivers of fragility, the nature and extent Somali fragility and its impact on neighbouring countries, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, and lastly look at the effectiveness of capacity building programs that have been established. Literature shows that there has been subsequent interclan conflict especially between the Darod and Hawiye which led to the suffering and death of defenceless civilians. Armed conflict continues to plague much of Somalia, but since 1995 its nature, duration, and intensity have changed significantly.

From 1995 to 2006, the majority of armed conflicts in Somalia occurred locally, pitting sub clans against one another in an increasingly fragmented political environment. The paper also illustrates how lawlessness remains a serious problem in Somalia. The pirates off the Somali coast have been a threat to international shipping since the beginning of civil war in the early 1990s. The nature of economy have also played part in Somali fragility, featuring violent banditry by armed gunmen and warfare waged principally over opportunities to loot. Competition for resources typically lies at the heart of conflict, this account for the intensity of the struggle for political power. Somali’s economy has continued to suffer due to civil war, insecurity, harsh climate conditions and an import ban on the country’s livestock. An estimated 250,000 Somalis died as a result of famine and warfare, and as many as a million fled to other countries as refugees. Several actors such as the United Nations, the United States of America, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African Union (AU), Arab League, African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and Italy have been involved in the situation in Somalia.

External actors have not, however, been able to effectively sober up the situation in Somalia. The nation building for the Fragile Somali calls for a different approach from the present use of military

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interventions and peace keepers. The researcher notes, and will demonstrate in due course, that three factors are central to the reconstituting of the Somali nation-state. These are: (1) a certain level of societal cohesion; (2) an accepted form of governance; and (3) sufficient and strategic support from the international community. The first two prerequisites are internal factors, without which even the strongest international support will yield no tangible results.

1. Introduction and Methodology

1.1. Introduction

Impetus for the research herein is drawn from the prevailing state of instability that has gripped Somalia over the last two decades. Although numerous attempts have been made towards restoration of peace, stability and good governance, the process has unfortunately been encumbered by diverse shortcomings, leaving the long-term prospects of the Somali people in an indeterminate state. Whereas there were widespread expectations that the intervention of neighbouring countries in the horn-of-Africa region and by extension the international community would solve the problem in Somalia, Somalia’s fragility remains far from solved.

Noting that the pursuit for a solution to the fragility of Somalia is central to the realization of regional stability, good governance and economic progression, this research seeks to identify and fix the loose ends hitherto impeding progress. The level of importance of the matter vis-à-vis the prevailing state of neglect presents issues of enormous interest for which in-depth research becomes imperative. The research is thus a process informed by the need to have a sustainable solution, foster lasting peace and promote good governance in Somalia.

The Approach/Organisation

The study is presented in five main parts, each comprising several sub-headings as appropriate. The introductory part provides an overall background on Somalia’s fragility, describes the context of the research, and renders a background of the problem under study. A brief history of relevant occurrences in Somalia then follows, alongside the main corrective steps attempted as well as challenges encountered from time to time. Literature review on the subject and methodology of the study also forms part of the research task at this stage.

The second part dwells at length on empirical discussions of the issue and studies from an analytical perspective the various fragility indices and matrices, including The State Fragility Index and Matrix, Failed States List 2011, The Human Development Index (HDI) of the UN Development Programme, The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (2008) of the Brookings Institution and the Worldwide Governance Indicators research project, sponsored by the World Bank.

Next is a discussion on the underlying drivers of conflict and fragility, particularly competition for natural resources, structural food insecurity, youth unemployment, abuse of public offices, environmental degradation, and external military or political interference.

Interventions by neighbouring states and the international community are also analysed, noting that, over the last twenty years, the international community has provided significant support to Somalia including humanitarian interventions, peacekeeping missions, and to a limited extent, development investments. In addition, the efficacy of these interventions is interrogated to determine sustainability in the long-term.

The final part of the presentation wraps up pertinent issues addressed and concludes in light of the experiences discussed. A raft of proposed recommendations then follows, all from the perspective of considered reforms.
Whilst there is no internationally-agreed definition of the term ‘fragile states’, or ‘fragility’, most development agencies define it principally as a fundamental failure of the state to perform functions necessary to meet citizens’ basic needs and expectations. Fragile states are commonly described as incapable of assuring basic security, maintaining rule of law and justice, or providing basic services and economic opportunities for their citizens. Accordingly, the OECD DAC recently characterized fragile states as: ‘unable to meet (their) population’s expectations or manage changes in expectations and capacity through the political process’ (OECD 2007).

DFID similarly defines fragile states as: ‘those where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor’ (DFID 2005). Increasingly, weak state legitimacy is understood to be a key defining characteristic of fragility. States that fail to meet basic needs and to keep societal expectations and state capacity in equilibrium can also fail to establish reciprocal state-society relations or create a binding social contract. The Centre for Research on Inequality and Social Exclusion, for example, defines fragile states as ‘[states that are] failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive service entitlements or legitimacy’ (CRISE 2009).

The context of the research herein is to make a candid assessment of the situation in Somalia against the backdrop of it having continually been termed as a ‘fragile’ (sometimes even ‘failed’) state. It is from this perspective that the paper goes to the activities that led to this situation, the drivers of fragility on a continuing basis and how interventions may be structured so as to effectively transform Somalia and the livelihoods of its people.

1.2 Conceptualization of State Fragility

The fragile states terminology has been much maligned as stigmatising and analytically imprecise. Many see the term ‘fragile’ as a
pejorative and inherently political label reflecting Weberian ideals of how a ‘successful’ state should function. At the empirical level, it arguably does not adequately differentiate between the unique economic and socio-political dimensions of states. Others contend that in practice, state fragility is not an ‘either/or’ condition, but varies along a continuum of performance, as well as across areas of state function and capacity.

In recognition of the empirical and normative shortcomings of the term ‘fragile states’, development agencies now increasingly favour the much broader terminology of ‘fragility’ or ‘situations of fragility’. These terms are also seen to better capture the fact that fragility is not exclusively determined by the nature and boundaries of states – there is a need to look beyond the state to the state of society in both assessing and addressing fragility. The conceptualization of state fragility has often been confounded within the literature by the conflicting and possibly constitutive concepts of sovereignty, good governance and state security. Brownlie (1979:75), for example, writes that a state has “a permanent population” within a “territory”, connotes a stable community” and an “effective government, with centralized administrative and legislative organs” and the “capacity to enter into relations with other States.”

In 1982, Jackson and Rosberg published a seminal article in World Politics. They argued that states in Africa (and elsewhere in the Third World) were empirically weak or underdeveloped. That is, these weak states often did not fulfill the Weberian assumption that the state has a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence. Thus, the state may not control substantial parts of its own territory or have the capacity to deliver goods and services to the population that resides within the borders that it ostensibly controls. However, because of the prevailing international norms created in the aftermath of the UN charter, Jackson and Rosberg argued that the weak states persisted primarily because of juridical statehood, i.e. the recognition of their legitimate membership in the international society of states with full international rights and duties, including the right not to be interfered with given prevailing international norms of non-interference. Hence, these states have juridical sovereignty and statehood rather than empirical statehood in simple Weberian terms. Sørensen, for example, discusses the three central features of an empirically weak or postcolonial state (Sørensen 2001: 104) in terms of government, economy and nationhood.

In terms of government, they are such states often characterized by “Captured autonomy” wherein elites controlling the state exploit their control for personal or narrow (i.e. non-state) interests. Because these states have weak administrative and institutional structures, rule may be based on coercion rather than on the rule of law. Institutional and administrative structures are weak and ineffective; they are frequently controlled by state elites who do not primarily seek to provide public or collective goods. In terms of economy, weak states do not create or maintain coherent national economies; they are often incoherent amalgamations of traditional agriculture, an informal petty urban sector and some fragments of modern industry, mostly controlled by external investors. Exports consist of one or a few primary products and the economies are highly dependent on imports of manufactured and technology-intensive products.

Lastly, there is no strong sense of nationhood among fragile states; ethnic identities connected to tribal, religious and similar characteristics continue to dominate. This is connected to the fact that the weak state does not deliver the goods of citizenship: legal, political, and social rights; state legitimacy then fails to develop and people turn to the ethnic communities for support (Jackson and Rosberg 1982. In Peter Goureivitch’s terms, the power of the institution of the state is weak because it does not have sufficient utility for its own population (1999:138–139).
Complicating the conceptual arena further is the argument summarized by Tom Weiss who suggests that the three recognized characteristics of a sovereign state since the Peace of Westphalia (territory, authority, population) are now supplemented by a fourth (respect for human rights) (Weiss 2005). This creates a need to consider not only the components of state capacity but also the how the state provides for, protects and/or violates the rights of the population within its borders. Thus Goldstone et al. (2005) incorporate conceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy in their fragility framework—the effectiveness and legitimacy considerations mirror the concern for delivering to the population and their recognition of the “value” of the state and hence their willingness to grant it legitimacy.

2. Literature Review

Drivers, Nature and Extent of Fragility Its Impact on Neighbouring Countries, and Effectiveness of Capacity Building Programs

2.1. Introduction

For over 18 years, Somalia seemingly has had endless crises—state collapse, failed peace talks, violent lawlessness and warlordism, internal displacement and refugee flows, chronic underdevelopment, intermittent famine, piracy, regional proxy wars, and Islamic extremism. Over the past 18 months, Somalia has descended into terrible levels of displacement and humanitarian need, armed conflict and assassinations, political meltdown, radicalization, and virulent anti-Americanism. Whereas in the past the country’s endemic political violence—whether Islamist, clan-based, factional, or criminal in nature—was local and regional in scope, it is now taking on global significance.

Between 1977 and 1991, the country endured three major armed conflicts. The first was the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 1977–78, in which Somali forces intervened in support of Somali rebel fighters in a bid to liberate the Somali-inhabited region of the Ogaden. Somalia lost the war and suffered around 25,000 casualties (World Bank 2005). Those losses sowed the seeds of future internal conflict, prompting the rise of several Somali liberation movements’ intent on overthrowing the military regime of Siyad Barre, whom they held accountable for the debacle. The first of these movements was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), established in 1978 by Abdullahi Yusuf. This mainly Majerten clan movement engaged the regime in periodic skirmishes in the northeast of the country and was met with harsh repression. The second major armed conflict was the war between the Somali military and the Somali National Movement (SNM) for control over northwest Somalia. The SNM was formed in 1981 by some members of the Isaaq clan following the Ogaden War. Isaaq grievances deepened over the course of the 1980s, when the Barre regime placed the northwest under military control and used the military administration to crack down on the Isaaq and dispossess them of their businesses. The civil war mounted by the SNM began in May 1988 and produced catastrophe. Government forces committed atrocities against civilians (an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 Somalis died, mostly members of the Isaaq clan, which was the core support for the SNM); aerial bombardments levelled the city of Hargeysa; and 400,000 Somalis were forced to flee across the Ethiopian border as refugees, while another 400,000 were internally displaced. These atrocities fuelled Isaaq demands for secession in what became the self-declared state of Somaliland in 1991.

The third armed conflict before 1991 pitted embattled government forces against a growing number of clan-based liberation movements in 1989 and 1990. The strongest of these movements included the United Somali Congress, USC (Hawiye clan), the Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogadeni clan), and the Somali Salvation Democratic Movement (Majerten clan). This multifront war presaged the predatory looting and banditry that characterized the warfare in 1991–92.
In addition to these wars, many other legacies of the Barre period fuel conflict in contemporary Somalia. First, the state was oppressive and exploitative, and was used by some political leaders to dominate others, monopolize state resources, and appropriate valuable land and other assets. As a result, reconciliation and power-sharing discussions in Somalia are complicated by high levels of distrust and a “zero-sum game” mentality toward political power and the state. Second, the leadership skillfully manipulated and politicized clan identity over two decades of divide-and-rule politics, leaving a legacy of deep clan divisions and grievances. Third, this period coincided with the height of Cold War competition in the Horn of Africa. That allowed the Barre regime to attract large quantities of military and economic aid. When the war ended, the level of expenditure, especially to maintain the bloated bureaucracy, was not sustainable and precipitated the fall of the regime.

As the Cold War waned in the late 1980s, Somalia’s strategic importance to the West diminished, enabling donors to place human rights conditions on aid to Somalia. Western donors froze aid to Somalia in response to the war with the SNM in the north. Stripped of its principal source of revenue, the Somali state shrank and eventually collapsed. An initiative by a group of eminent Somalis known as the “Manifesto Group” to broker reconciliation and establish a provisional post-Barre government was met with arrests by the Barre regime in April 1990.

2.2. Empirical Discussions

The State Fragility Index and Matrix 2010 shows Somalia to have fragility index of 25, which denotes extreme fragility (Marshall and Cole 2010). The index lists all independent countries in the world in which the total country population is greater than 500,000 as at 2010 (164 countries). The Fragility Matrix then scores each country on both Effectiveness and Legitimacy in four performance dimensions: Security, Political, Economic, and Social, at the end of the year 2010. Each of the matrix indicators is rated on a four-point fragility scale: 0 “no fragility,” 1 “low fragility,” 2 “medium fragility,” and 3 “high fragility” with the exception of the Economic Effectiveness indicator, which is rated on a five-point fragility scale (including 4 “extreme fragility”). The State Fragility Index, then, combines scores on the eight indicators and ranges from 0 “no fragility” to 25 “extreme fragility.” A country’s fragility is closely associated with its state capacity to manage conflict; to make and implement public policy; and to deliver essential services and its systemic resilience in maintaining system coherence, cohesion, and quality of life; responding effectively to challenges and crises, and continuing progressive development.

The State Fragility Index and Matrix was originally introduced in “Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility 2007.” In order to standardize procedures for scoring each of the eight component indicators in order to make the indicators and indices comparable across time, we set threshold values for the categorical fragility scores based on cut-points derived from values in a baseline year (2004).

The 2008 worst country rankings show that many indices agree in ranking Somalia as the most fragile country. Equally, the ‘Failed states list 2011’ included 177 states, of which 35 were classified as “alert”, 88 as “warning”, 40 as “moderate”, 11 as “sustainable”. Somali was named as the worst of them all. Somalia has particularly been on the decline over the past decade, ending up as the worst by far in 2011 and four preceding years.

In the seven years of the Failed States Index, Somalia has had the ignominious distinction of occupying the worst spot for the past four years straight. Despite having a relatively functional and pretty much autonomous ‘state’ in the north, Somaliland, the country as a whole still manages to score badly enough to make up for
The UNDP Human Development Index (2001) is primarily an indication of human welfare and public service delivery rather than explicitly failed states, and the World Bank rankings focus on governance. Somalia, for example, appears as the weakest – and thus the epitome of a failed state – on the Brookings, Failed States Index, World Bank Index, and the State Fragility Index, and second only to Iraq on the Global Peace Index.

2.3. Internal Drivers of State Fragility

Bad governance and weak, if not absent, institutions are the first and foremost drivers of state fragility in Somalia. Other factors associated with fragility include: poor economic development policies, violent conflict, tribalism, natural resources, external shocks and the international system. Academic research has shown that power selection mechanisms, control on a state’s executive, and public participation in political processes are the three main components that explain institutional weakness. The situation in Somalia is largely rooted in political institutions not being strong enough to manage effectively the natural conflicts that occur in society. This ‘fragility’ or weakness is most evident at any time that the state undergoes processes of economic, political and social change.

Notable in understanding fragility is to comprehend where weaknesses exist in a state’s institutions. This relates to the incentives governing the behaviour of social groups, particularly those with political power. Like states in a similar indeterminate situation, Somalia’s political systems and institutions are in some form of protracted transition and are trapped in the maze of fragility. This may be compounded by frustrated expectations amongst a population desiring higher levels of service delivery or more opportunity for political participation.

Though negligible, economic and recurrent famine factors have significant impact on
state fragility in Somalia but their effects are generally less pronounced than the strength of a state’s institutions. In the strict sense, economic development is not necessarily a prerequisite for preventing fragility, but a lack of progressive growth will mean that institution building is more difficult than otherwise.

Lack of political will by all Somali stakeholders has also been identified as a major driving force to Somali’s fragility. Since 1991, Somalia has been the archetypal failed state. Several attempts to create a transitional set-up have failed and neither is the TFG doing well. There is, again, the issue of Islamist insurgency, which is another major hindrance of establishing strong and central government. Over the last two years, the situation has deteriorated into one of the world’s worst humanitarian and security crises, partly by al-Shabab’s draconian law of barring international aids to go through and the failure of seasonal rain. Moreover, the international community is preoccupied with a symptom of the famine—rain failure and al-Shabab’s factor—instead of concentrating on the core of the crisis, the need for a political settlement. Additionally, factors such as imbalance of natural resource endowment, ethnic composition and a colonial heritage do not in themselves drive fragility. Rather, it is inequitable distribution and the political manipulation in allocation of these factors that can impact on state stability. This manipulation is apparent in Somalia in view of existence of weak institutions. Violent conflict is the ultimate manifestation of state fragility. However, it is not just an outcome of fragility; it can also be a driving factor of fragility, either prevailing or in the future. This is due to reduced levels of GDP, increased strain on political institutions, and the social tensions that often come to prominence as a result of violent conflict.

States do not operate in isolation, yet regional drivers of fragility are often overlooked in responses to fragile states. There is strong evidence, as will be shown in the next sub-heading, that fragility has far reaching consequences beyond a state’s borders. The evidence suggests some important policy implications for DFID and other donors. Foremost is the need to support political institutions into the long term, beyond technical assistance and beyond short-term democracy and electoral interventions. There needs to be a broader understanding of institutional support than has been recognised up until now.

Civilians normally suffer more in internal conflicts than in interstate conflicts, as was evident of Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda (Abdulle and Yahya 2004). Issues leading to internal conflicts are of high political sensitivity; some examples include quality of governance, law and order, equity of economic and social systems and ethnic discrimination.

2.4. External Actors/Drivers

Several actors have been involved in the situation in Somalia: they include United Nations, United States, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGÅD), Arab League, Al-Qaeda, AU, AMISOM and Italy. The situation in Somalia has faced challenges in attempting to solve the internal conflict. Such internationalized confrontations are difficult to resolve due to the following factors. There are fewer rules to go by in the management of internal conflicts in Africa. In most documented conflict circumstances, rules have only been established for interstate conflicts. Some of the external actors include the following.

2.4.1. United Nations

It has been the principle of the UN to support sustainable peace building particularly in countries that are prone to violent conflict or historical disturbances. United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was the second phase of the United Nations intervention in Somalia, from March 1993 until March 1995.
UNOSOM II carried on from the United States-controlled (but UN-sanctioned) Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which had in turn taken over from the ineffectual United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) mission. All three of these interventions were aimed at creating a secure enough environment for humanitarian operations to be carried out in the increasingly lawless and famine-stricken country.

Even after the withdrawal of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in March 1995, the United Nations has been closely monitoring the developments in and around Somalia through the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), established in Nairobi and headed by Mr. David Stephen (United Kingdom). At the same time, the United Nations has been encouraging peacemaking efforts by others, mainly by regional governments and organizations. Since October 1997, the United Nations Secretariat has been organizing a periodic “Meeting of External Actors” in Somalia. With the participation of members of the Security Council, relevant regional organizations and those countries that have taken peacemaking initiatives, the Meeting proved to be a useful vehicle to ensure better coordination of peacemaking efforts in Somalia.

In August 1999, the United Nations Secretary-General, in his report on Somalia to the General Assembly, stated that the re-establishment of a functioning state in Somalia would require not only an enormous effort and political will on the part of the Somali people and their leaders but also “a massive rebuilding operation” as an “accompaniment of any peace process”. He further stated that the stage had been reached at which “it may be appropriate for the UN to play an enhanced role in Somalia” working with its partners “to help bring about national unity and the restoration of a national government.” This included a review of the role of the United Nations in Somalia, recommending a possible relocation of some UN programmes to Somalia, the establishment of a trust fund to support the peace process and concomitant development, and ways to protect the rights of Somalis in the absence of state sovereignty.

The humanitarian situation in Somalia has always been extremely fragile, with thousands of people suffering from the cumulative effects of nearly a decade of armed conflict, a fractured economic infrastructure, low food production and the virtual absence of health and educational services. In parallel with humanitarian assistance, the UN has played a great role in several attempts in rebuilding the country, all of which are dismally failed mainly because they were not corresponding the realities on the ground, and the UN was pursuing a narrow policy settlement. A classic failure of UN’s attempt is the Djubouti conference where the UNPOS have entirely orchestrated the entire reconciliation process that led the election of the current president Sheikh Sharif. Admittedly, UN have a lot to attribute to the state fragility in Somalia.

2.4.2 United States

The United States Army has a long tradition of humanitarian relief. The Army began by assisting in relief operations in Somalia. But by December 1992, it was deeply engaged on the ground in Operation RESTORE HOPE in that chaotic African country. In the spring of the following year, the initial crisis of imminent starvation seemed to be over, and the U.S.-led Unified Taskforce (UNITAF) turned over the mission to the United Nations, leaving only a small logistical, aviation, and quick reaction force behind to assist. The American public seemed to forget about Somalia. That sense of “mission accomplished” made the events of 3–4 October 1993 more startling, as Americans reacted to the spectacle of dead U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets by cheering Somali mobs—the very people Americans thought they had rescued from starvation.

‘The international community backed by UN troops should move in and rule Somalia, because
it has no government at all’, declared president of CARE US in September 1992. It was total anarchy, wanton destruction and collapse of social, economic and political structures (Meredith 2006).

Fresh from its victory in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the US military was keen to prove that it could undertake operations other than war. The opportunity to sort out a few rag tag militias in Somalia, while in pursuit of humanitarian objectives, seemed an ideal test (Meredith 2006). On 3rd December 1992, UN authorized United Taskforce (UNITAF) to do all necessary to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia. UNITAF was to be led by US military, contributing 28,000 men, with France, Belgium, Canada, Italy, Nigeria and other nations. President Bush, savouring the prospect of a further triumph with which to end his presidency, called the mission “Operation Restore Hope”. There was a disagreement on whether the troops should disarm the militia because this was not their mission and they did not want casualties. The US troops landed in Mogadishu in December 1992 and left in May 1993; they saved hundreds of thousands of lives that could have perished without their timely intervention (Mukhtar 2003). Although disarming the militia was not their mission, when they arrived, most Somalis expected them to disarm the militia. Aideed and Mahdi accepted American presence.

On their arrival, they allowed Aideed and Mahdi and other warlords to keep their arsenal intact in designated compounds. No attempt was made to round up heavy weapons let alone disarm the militia. Few days later the army patrol arrested a group of Aideed gunmen loading up arsenals of weapons in a building near the US Embassy. The army commander instructed the patrol leader to let them go. From then on, the militia leaders knew they were untouchable. After this incident the Somalis concluded that “Operation Restore Hope” was little more than a cynical deal between USA and the warlords.

UNITAF lasted for five months and made little impact in southern Somalia. UNITAF’s presence provided opportunity for negotiations at Addis Ababa in 1993. After UNITAF left, UNOSOM II was formed. At the southern port of Kismayu in Feb. 1993, UNITAF allowed a rival Darod militia led by Siad Barre’s son-in-law to occupy the town, ousting a pro-Aideed militia. Aideed interpreted this as an accretion of war. US continued to kill wrong persons and Somalis called it a camp of murderers. When UN planned to attack the place where Aideed leaved, the UN planes were shot down and a one-hour affair turned to 14 hours (Meredith 2006).

Recently, the Obama Administration introduced the dual track policy toward Somalia which has had disturbing consequences on the efforts of building peace and a functioning state in Somalia. In retrospect, the dual track policy only provides a new label for the old (and failed) Bush Administration’s approach. It inadvertently strengthens clan divisions, undermines inclusive and democratic trends and most importantly, creates a conducive environment for the return of the organized chaos or warlordism in the country.

The dual track policy is not new. Washington has often dealt with whomever it wanted in Somalia: regions, warlords, and different groups. The Bush Administration, without formally announcing it as a policy, engaged all kinds of sub-state actors in the country, including the two stable regions of Somaliland and Puntland and some of Somalia’s most notorious warlords. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear now that it was counter-productive to undermine the Somali government while supporting warlords in Mogadishu, the capital, 2006. And after the warlords failed to establish authority in Mogadishu, it was expedient for Washington to ignore the Somali government and instead support the Ethiopian invasion. Ethiopia has also pursued a similar policy toward Somalia, called the building block approach, for the last two decades. This approach, in a nutshell, did not lead Somalia into peace. Instead, it empowered extremist groups.
New or not, the unintended consequence of the Obama Administration’s dual track policy is that it sharpened already divisive clan identities in Somalia and made a sensitive political condition more volatile. Soon after it was announced, most Somali clans and sub-clans interpreted the policy to mean that the US would only deal with clans who had regional administrations of their own. Consequently, more than 20 nominal clan-owned regional administrations have been created since the dual track policy was announced. The rush to establish clan-owned regions has exacerbated the divisions among Somalis. For example, even members of the same sub-clan could not agree on one regional administration. The sub-clan based region idea reinforces the concept that a given clan exclusively owns part of the country. Because of this, Somalis’ citizen-based rights and the collective ownership of the country have been damaged. There is also a well-founded fear that this may plant seeds for potential inter-clan conflict. By now, the US must have realized that the dual track policy has sent the wrong message to Somalis.

In a nutshell, US have contributed to the already failed situation in Somalia by arming warlords, supporting policies that are not inclusive in the form of “war on terror”. More appallingly, they pursued a very narrow policy of counter-terrorism. These are not the core problem of Somalia but rather the symptoms.

2.4.3 Ethiopia

Ethiopia-Somalia hostility dates back to 1950s. Somalia refused to acknowledge in particular the validity of the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1954 recognizing Ethiopia’s claim to the Haud or, in general, the relevance of treaties defining Somali-Ethiopian borders. Somalia’s position was based on three points: first, that the treaties disregarded agreements made with the clans that had put them under British protection; second, that the Somalis were not consulted on the terms of the treaties and in fact had not been informed of their existence; and third, that such treaties violated the self-determination principle.

Incidents began to occur in the Haud within six months after Somali independence. At first the incidents were confined to minor clashes between Ethiopian police and armed parties of Somali nomads, usually resulting from traditional provocations such as smuggling, livestock rustling, and tax collecting, rather than irredentist agitation. Their actual causes aside, these incidents tended to be viewed in Somalia as expressions of Somali nationalism. Hostilities grew steadily, eventually involving small-scale actions between Somali and Ethiopian armed forces along the border. In February 1964, armed conflict erupted along the Somali-Ethiopian frontier, and Ethiopian aircraft raided targets in Somalia. Hostilities ended in April through the mediation of Sudan, acting under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Under the terms of the cease-fire, a joint commission was established to examine the causes of frontier incidents, and a demilitarized zone—ten to fifteen kilometres wide—was established on either side of the border. At least temporarily, further military confrontations were prevented.

The Ogaden War (1977–1978) between Ethiopia against Somalia in the Ogaden desert area remains one of the notable conflicts between the two states. The Soviet Union and Cuba aided Ethiopia, with Cuba sending nearly 15,000 troops, aided by 1,500 Soviet advisors. Somalia lost the war, its military was wrecked, and the stage was set for the civil war of the 1980s. The cumulative effect of wars with neighbouring states, most damagingly the 1977–78 Ogaden war with Ethiopia, has been cited as one of the causes of collapse of the Somali state. The SNA never recovered from its defeat in the Ogaden War. The battles to retake and then defend the Ogaden stripped the Somali armed forces of many troops, much of their equipment, and their Soviet patron. For the next decade, the SNA sought unsuccessfully to improve its capability by relying on a variety of foreign sources, including the United States. The Ogaden War therefore remains the best example of the SNA’s ability to mount and sustain conventional military operations.
Ethiopia later entered Somalia in 2006 after representatives of Somalia’s courts declared a holy war against the nation. Its forces pushed as far as Somalia’s capital of Mogadishu. At first successful in driving armed militants from the capital, Ethiopia’s efforts have recently only served to motivate new members to join Al-Shabab, which entered the international spotlight earlier this year when it announced its members would join the fight against sea pirates after a group seized a Saudi oil tanker. According to the BBC, intelligence reports tell of an increase from 600 Al-Shabab members when Ethiopia first invaded to up to 3,000 today.

Although the United Nations has called for countries to contribute forces to a peacekeeping effort, it has received almost no response, while the United States has kept a silent but visible presence in the region. Reportedly contributing financial, logistical and military support to the Ethiopian forces, U.S. forces have also been tied to secretly supporting secular warlords in their fight for power against militant Islamic groups (Coats 2009). The breakdown of the current government and exodus of Ethiopian forces provides an opportunity for Al-Shabab or other militant groups to expand their reach in Somalia, further threatening food distribution to an already starving population.

2.4.5 African Union

The African Union is only ten years old, having been launched in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002 by the leaders of the 53 African States. In the intervening years, it has established a range of bodies, mechanisms, protocols and institutions. A sufficient amount of effort has been focused on creating a peace and security architecture to combat the multitude of challenges that the AU has been facing. Current efforts by the AU invite comparisons with its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Tim Murithi 2008). The African Union was given the right to intervene without consent, in a member state in order to “restore peace and stability”, to prevent war crimes, genocide, and crime against humanity, and in response to “a serious threat to legitimate order” (Meredith 2006 and AU Constitutive Act 2002 Article 4 Para 8 &10).

The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. AMISOM is mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 (United Nations Security Council). The operation is largely unpopular among Somalis and many folks deemed AMISOM as insult to the injury and not serving Somalis interest. Such view exacerbated the already fragile situation on the ground. Unless AMISOM’s mandate is modified into more peace building, rather than peace-keeping, AMISOM’s presence would contribute to the perpetuation of the situation.

2.5. Nature and Extent of State Fragility in Somalia

The world has grown numb to Somalia’s seemingly endless crises—18 years of state collapse, failed peace talks, violent lawlessness and warlord-ism, internal displacement and refugee flows, chronic underdevelopment, intermittent famine, piracy, regional proxy wars, and Islamic extremism. It would be easy to conclude that today’s disaster is merely a continuation of a long pattern of intractable problems there, and move on to the next story in the newspaper. So Somalia’s in flames again—what’s new? The answer is that much is new this time, and it would be a dangerous error of judgment to brush off Somalia’s current crisis as more of the same. It would be equally dangerous to call for the same tired formulas for U.N. peacekeeping, state-building, and counterterrorism operations that have achieved
little since 1990. Seismic political, social, and security changes are occurring in the country, and none bode well for the people of Somalia or the international community. Over the past 18 months, Somalia has descended into terrible levels of displacement and humanitarian need, armed conflict and assassinations, political meltdown, radicalization, and virulent anti-Americanism. Whereas in the past the country’s endemic political violence—whether Islamism, clan-based, factional, or criminal in nature—was local and regional in scope, it is now taking on global significance.

As Enough’s April 2008 report on Somalia ("15 Years After Black hawk down: Somalia’s Chance?") argued, this is the exact opposite of what the United States and its allies sought to promote when they supported the December 2006 Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia to oust an increasingly bellicose Islamism movement in Mogadishu. Indeed, the situation in Somalia today exceeds the worst-case scenarios conjured up by regional analysts when they first contemplated the possible impact of an Ethiopian military occupation. How did it get to be this bad? The current crisis in Somalia is the culmination of a series of developments since 2004, when national reconciliation talks produced an agreement on a Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG, led by President Abdullah Yusuf, was intended to be a government of national unity, tasked with administering a five-year political transition. But the TFG was viewed by many Somalis, especially some clans in and around the capital Mogadishu, as a narrow coalition dominated by the clans of the president and his prime minister, Mohamed Ghedi. It was also derided by its critics as being a puppet of neighbouring Ethiopia. Yusuf’s deep animosity toward any and all forms of political Islam alarmed the increasingly powerful network of Islamism’s operating schools, hospitals, businesses, and local Islamic courts in Mogadishu. By early 2005, serious splits emerged within the TFG between what became known as the “Mogadishu Group” and Yusuf’s supporters. Facing deep opposition in Mogadishu, they were unable to establish themselves in the capital, taking up residence instead in two small provincial towns. Weak and dysfunctional, the TFG appeared destined to become yet another stillborn government in Somalia, which has not had an operational central government since 1990. The coalition of clans, militia leaders, civic groups, and Islamists which formed the Mogadishu Group were themselves divided, however, and war erupted between two wings of the group in early 2006.

Somalia today is in anarchy as an unruly, ungoverned space between its neighbours and the sea. The U.N-sanctioned transitional government (TFG), the 14th government since 1991, controls only a few city-blocks. The TFG has not governed in a traditional sense. At best, it is an unrepresentative group of warlords with meagre prospects who rebranded themselves as a “government” (Peter 2008). A radical youth militia, Al Shabab (rather than the TFG) actually maintains control of Somalia’s southern and central regions. Beyond even the political crisis, all the elements for another famine are lining up again, as Jeffrey (2009) observes: war rages on unconstrained amidst drought, swelling food prices, and the exodus of foreign aid workers. With 3.8 million people urgently in need of relief, Somalia has once again become the site of one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises (Bronwyn 2009). Freedom House, an NGO that conducts research and advocacy for democracy, political freedom, and human rights, lists Somalia as an “Unreformed Autocracy” and has rated Somalia a 6-7 for political rights and civil liberties. The rating scores scale from 1 to 7 (April and Gordon 2007). Peter Pham of James Madison University, seeing the current state of Somalia, asserts the urgent need for change. “Unitary Somalia… has been dead for a decade and a half… Reanimation is no longer in the realm of the possible.” (Peter 2008). The future of Somalia is uncertain, and the path to peace and stability is unclear, but whichever direction the world decides to move in will require a new norm for the African continent as a whole. It will require an African solution and commitment. Success or failure in the Horn of Africa will have broader implications than the
Some from Djibouti and others from the Diaspora, and they knew nothing about the issues on the ground (Abdulle and Yahya, 2004).

Again Arta peace process also failed and another conference which was organized by IGAD was held in Nairobi, Kenya following two years discussion (2002–2004). This conference resulted in Abdullahi Yusuf being elected as President of TFG in 2005. In June–September 2006, the League of Arab States hosted a reconciliation meeting in Khartoum where the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and TFG signed Khartoum one agreement to recognize the legality of the TFG. The TFG and the ICU were to work towards the reintegration of the forces and to continue the dialogue, but this was never implemented. In July to August 2007, the National Reconciliation Congress was held in Mogadishu, where 2,600 delegates, including clan representatives, women groups and the Diaspora, attended. In September 2007 the congress for the liberation and reconstitution of Somalia made up of ICU and former parliamentarians met in Asmara, and established the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia and also adopted an action plan. In November 2008, Nur Ade was elected as the Prime Minister and in June 2008 the TFG and ARS initiated an Agreement in Djibouti (UNPOS December 2008). As a result of Djibouti agreement in December, the TFG had a new leadership in January 2009 with Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as the President elected by Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) following resignation of TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed in December 2008 (Mbugua 2009) (see Table 1).

2.6. Programmes/Capacity Building Efforts to Address Fragility in Somali

Despite the seemingly long conflict, Somalia has attempted approximately 12 recorded peace agreements since 1991 that have failed (ACCORD 2007). The first peace agreement was Djibouti reconciliation conference held in Djibouti in July 1991; it was followed by Addis Ababa Agreement in March 1993 where heads and representatives of 14 Somali factions signed an agreement in Addis Ababa for an immediate cease fire, disarmament and cessation of hostilities among all Somalis; the Sodere Declaration in Ethiopia in January 1997 where the National Salvation Council was established and consisted of 41 members from all clans. Then, there was the Cairo Accord/Declaration which was signed by 26 rival Somali faction leaders who agreed to cease hostilities (Mukhtar 2003) it was followed by the Arta Reconciliation Conference of May to August 2000. On the announcement of Djibouti intention to hold a Somali peace conference, three things were clear to any political analyst who understood Somali. The questions of inclusion, the credibility of the delegates and how the future Somali state will look like were to be discussed. These issues were flawed by the Djibouti Government during the Arta Peace Process. Majority of Somalis were unrepresented, the delegates were handpicked; some from Djibouti and others from the Diaspora, and they knew nothing about the issues on the ground (Abdulle and Yahya, 2004).
a border with a fragile or failed state – a ‘low-income country under The Romanian Economic Journal stress’ or LICUS in the World Bank’s terminology – have economic growth rates that average 1.6 percentage points lower than those in states which are not neighbouring (Chauvet and Collier, 2005).

Finally, another enormous regional cost of state failure is the spread of malaria and HIV/AIDS that accompanies refugee flows (World Bank 2003). As the world becomes more and more interdependent, the global threats posed by state failure and collapse increase. When states lose control over what goes on within their borders,
the result is ‘ungoverned spaces’. These lawless areas allow drug production and trafficking, international terrorism, and other global crime to flourish. Coordinated action on the part of the international community is essential to curb the global risks of failed states.

The impact on the Kenya-Somalia border area was immediate and disastrous, especially in the first two years of civil war and famine. One of the major impacts was the **refugee flows and humanitarian crises**— the collapse of the Barre government triggered a massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of Somalis into the Jubba regions and northern Kenya. Tens of thousands of Somalis poured into Kenya on foot, by ship, and air, seeking safe haven or passage to third countries.

According to Goldsmith (1997), fragility in Somali has promoted **armed conflicts, famine, and lawlessness**— upon the fall of the government, southern Somalia fell into heavily-armed chaos. Swarms of uncontrolled gunmen and residents looted everything of value in government buildings and in Mogadishu’s residential neighbourhoods. Inter-clan violence led to massacres, ethnic cleansing, and a massive exodus of displaced persons in all directions. Armed battles pitting factions of the Darood and Hawiye clan-families swept across the countryside. In several instances, fighting briefly spilled across the Kenyan border. The area between Mogadishu and the Kenyan border became a “shatter zone” within which residents were exposed to repeated rounds of looting until they began to starve. The massive famine which occurred from late 1991 through 1992, and which ultimately claimed an estimated 240,000 Somali lives, was thus almost entirely due to armed conflict and wartime plundering (Refugee Policy Group 1994).

**Conflict in Somali has also led to arms flows**— the Somali civil war produced a major weapons flow in the Kenya-Somalia border area. Both government troops and liberation fronts looted the enormous Cold War armories of the army, producing a free flow of weapons and ammunition on the street. At the same time, the fall of the Mengistu government in Ethiopia and the disbanding of the Ethiopian army in 1991 flooded the regional market with cheap weaponry. Still more arms found their way into Somalia via the rapidly growing global arms trafficking in the immediate post Cold War era. Some of these weapons found their way into Kenya, where they helped to produce destabilization in the border area and gave criminal elements in Nairobi greater access to cheap semi-automatic weapons. By 1991, the Kenyan police and military in northern Kenya were outgunned by clan militias and criminal gangs.

**Rise of the Islamist factor is another impact of conflict in Somalia;** according to Goldsmith (1997), the Jubba valley became a major site of activity for the small but important Islamist movement which emerged in post-Barre Somalia. **Al Ittihad Al Islamiyya (AIAI)** briefly controlled Kismayo seaport in 1991, controlled the town and district of Luuq (Gedo region) from 1991 to 1996, and vied with the Marehan faction Somali National Front (SNF) for control of Beled Hawa. Much of AIAI’s support came from guri Marehan who saw the organization as an effective resistance to the galti-dominated SNF. In Luuq, AIAI imposed sharia law and may have had links with foreign terrorists from Sudan, but also succeeded in establishing basic security and rule of law at a time when the rest of southern Somalia was in a state of anarchy. Since 1996, AIAI has essentially disbanded, forming a loose network of “alumni” who are integrated into their Somali communities. Some small cells of radical Islamists possibly linked to AIAI nonetheless maintained a presence in the Kenya-Somalia border areas, and intermittently placed training or staging camps along the isolated coastal area at Ras Kamboni and El Wak. Terror suspects in the attacks on the US Embassy in Nairobi in 1998 and on the Paradise Beach Hotel in Mombasa in 1999 crossed the Kenya-Somali border and used southern Somalia as both a transshipment point and safe
haven in those attacks. Fears that the unpoliced border provides foreign or Somali terrorists with easy entrance into Kenya and an easy escape route remain strong and have been a major preoccupation of Western counter-terrorism partnership with the Kenyan government. But it is also the case that the Ethiopian government and local Somali factions hoping to secure advantage against local rivals often exaggerate the threat of radical Islamism in the region, making accurate assessment of the threat of terrorism in the Jubba area more difficult. Even more difficult has been differentiating between legitimate Islamist movements in the region and those with links to terrorism.

However, there has been high rise of transit trade into Kenya— the Kenya-Somalia border region, once an isolated area with little trade, has since the early 1990s been transformed economically by the rise of a vibrant and profitable transit trade into Kenya. Somali entrepreneurs exploit the absence of customs and taxes in Somalia to move a range of consumer goods – sugar, dry foodstuffs (rations), cloth, basic household items, fuel, cigarettes, and light electronics – across the Kenyan border into the lucrative Nairobi market. Goods are either smuggled over the Kenyan border via unpoliced track roads, or bribes are paid to customs officers at official crossings. Most of this transit trade arrives at beach ports near Mogadishu, but the all-weather seaport at Kismayo is used to import sugar destined for Kenya. The trade has helped to create or expand a number of border towns from Dobley to Beled Hawa, where goods are offloaded into small warehouses and reloaded onto Kenyan trucks. This commerce has also helped to produce a network of cross-clan business partnerships with a vested interest in safe and open roads.

Conclusion

The thread that runs throughout the foregoing presentation is, from a reform perspective, that there is an urgent need to transform the disenfranchised segments of the Somalia population into stakeholders of a process of state-building. Admittedly, there is no “one-solution-fits-all” magical bullet to this. States are complex and we have to look at particularities and contexts of every situation. There are specific mechanisms to reach different groups of these internal stakeholders (political elites, business elites, “ordinary citizens”).

In ‘Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development’, Kaplan (2000) asserts that social cohesion is a necessary prerequisite to fix, or build successful fragile states. He defines social cohesion as shared informal institutions, built-up social capital, and the level of interpersonal trust within a society. As a business consultant to companies in developing countries, Kaplan’s private sector perspective aims to improve the investment conditions in fragile states. He states that the business environment must be able to support and sustain private investment, and secure low-cost transactions and property rights in order for development efforts to be successful. The central thesis, thus, is that building social cohesion is the fundamental frame through which to view all efforts at ameliorating situations of fragility and achieving long-term development successes. Stated differently, this consists of reducing the impacts of the environment of mistrust in fragile states.

Somalia is a country gripped by prolonged conflicts, political vacuum, instabilities, weak institutions, raise of Islamists, piracy and famine. The international community’s engagement in redressing these problems has repeatedly been counterproductive, and hasn’t yielded any solution. Ironically, the international community has opted for propping up weak governments, corrupted officials, and pursued ill-advised strategies in Somalia.

The coast of Somali’s instability is immensely great and poses certain level of threat to the region as well as to other international countries. The rise of al-Shabab, the burgeoning business of piracy, the failed-state are all raising concerns that the country could become a hotbed for international terrorist activity. More appallingly, an entire generation view Somalia as threat and hopeless. They perceived the current existing
systems including the TFG/AMISOM and other warring factions as self-serving entities. It is therefore high time for international community to reverse its course in Somalia and address the underlying problems with sensible and long-term commitment.

**Recommendations**

There is no “one-solution-fits-all” magical bullet; states are complex and we have to look at particularities and context. The recommendations in the Somalia Country Chapter are a product of wide consultations, and actions on these recommendations on the part of all actors would be a positive and necessary step to improve the situation in Somalia. It is hoped that carrying these recommendations forward will have discernible impact on mutual accountability frameworks, and build confidence of the Somali population that engagement can lead to a different and more positive outcome.

**Address drivers of fragility in Somalia in the long term:** A sustainable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world’s most fragile states will need to be driven by their own leadership and people. International actors can affect outcomes in fragile states in both positive and negative ways. International engagement will not by itself put an end to state fragility, but the adoption of the following shared principles can help maximise the positive impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm. The principles are intended to help international actors foster constructive engagement between national and international stakeholders in countries with problems of weak governance and conflict, and during episodes of temporary fragility in the stronger performing countries. They are designed to support existing dialogue and coordination processes, not to generate new ones. In particular, they aim to complement the partnership commitments set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. As experience deepens, the principles will be reviewed periodically and adjusted as necessary.

**Recognize the links between political, security and development objectives:** The challenges faced by fragile states are multi-dimensional. Somalis is exceptional in this case, and they must be addressed as exceptional. The political, security, economic and social spheres are inter-dependent. Importantly, there may be tensions and trade-offs between objectives, particularly in the short-term, which must be addressed when reaching consensus on strategy and priorities. For example, international objectives in some fragile states may need to focus on peace-building in the short-term, to lay the foundations for progress against the MDGs in the longer-term. This underlines the need for international actors to set clear measures of progress in fragile states. Within donor governments, a “whole-of-government” approach is needed, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. Partner governments also need to ensure coherence between ministries in the priorities they convey to the international community.

**Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors:** This can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership. Where possible, it is important to work together on: upstream analysis; joint assessments; shared strategies; and coordination of political engagement. Practical initiatives can take the form of joint donor offices, an agreed division of labour among development partners, delegated co-operation arrangements, multi-donor trust funds and common reporting and financial requirements. Wherever possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities. In the case of countries in transition from conflict or international disengagement, the use of simple integrated planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, can help set and monitor realistic priorities.
Need for practical co-ordination: National actors suggested that co-ordination was Nairobi-centric and lacked accountability. International actors suggested the emerging Somaliland joint co-ordination structures were, if implemented in full, over-elaborate. All actors agreed on the need to move appropriate co-ordination structures to Somaliland and for Somaliland actors to be in the lead; all actors approved focus on results, enhanced transparency and accountability.

Focus on state building as the central objective: States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and safeguarding the security and human rights of their populations. International engagement will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the relationship between state and society, through engagement in two main areas. Firstly, supporting the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement, and peace-building. Secondly, strengthening the capability of states to fulfil their core functions in order to reduce poverty. Priority functions include: ensuring security and justice; mobilizing revenue; and establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance and employment generation. Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens’ confidence, trust and engagement with state institutions. Civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery.

It is not enough to remove the destructive features of an old system: Rather, a positive institutional structure must be created if stability is to be achieved and endured.

In other words, stabilising fragile states is frequently a state-building exercise. While not a label many policymakers want to use, acknowledging this reality will facilitate more effective interventions. The objective is not simply to rebuild the (dysfunctional) institutions that existed previously. New structure, norms, and incentives are needed.

In stabilising fragile states, priority should be given to addressing the vulnerabilities of instability: illegitimacy, a weak security sector, and relative deprivation. Tackling each of these three deficiencies is important and mutually reinforcing. Accordingly, they need to be addressed simultaneously.

There are often tensions between the demands and priorities of the international community and the demands and needs within the country; Strategies for state capacity enhancement should be nationally driven; to be successful they cannot be driven from the outside; ownership is key.

The topic of fragile states is a substantial one extending beyond the focus on conflict and international responses taken in this paper. Understanding and dealing with state fragility and failure and its consequences is a relatively newly emerging field, the success of which may very well define the nature of development in the first part of the twenty first century. Justice cannot be done to the entire field in a single article, not even in a book. However, it is hoped that this paper could play a modest role in stimulating further research, thought, and action towards a crucially important challenge facing humanity.

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NEW PUBLICATIONS

The Influence of Climate Change and Human-Induced Environmental Degradation on Lake Victoria

Julius B. Lejju

Impacts of global climate changes such as rising temperatures and changes in precipitation are already affecting ecosystems in the Lake Victoria region of East Africa. These changes have threatened the lives of the riparian population and the reduction in lake levels has attracted conflicting speculation with environmentalists attributing it to reduced rainfall experienced in the East African region, while hydrologists blame it on environmental degradation and excessive water release through the operations of the two hydroelectric power dams near the source of the Nile.

This book presents sedimentary and documentary evidence of long-term climate and environment history of the Lake Victoria basin. Climatic records indicate reduced precipitation in the region from cal 780 AD with periods of low precipitation and extreme conditions occurring in the later part of the 1500s to 1600s AD and in the early 1800s AD and 1920s. These scientific findings provide additional information for better understanding of the past environmental conditions in the Lake Basin and causes for the dynamics of the lake basin, including the management options of the lake ecosystem.

The Rural-Urban Nexus in Migration and Livelihoods Diversification: A Case Study of East Esté Wereda and Bahir Dar Town, Amhara Region

Abeje Berhanu

Migration has increasingly become a universal human experience. This is more so with rural to urban migration, and Ethiopia is no exception. Expansion of transportation and communication infrastructure as well as proliferation of construction and urban development activities is providing further impetus for an increased exodus of rural people into towns and cities. Migration is being seen by rural people as a means to escape rural poverty through livelihood diversification. Through migration migrants are able to improve their situation and that of their families and relatives who, for now, might choose to stay behind. Rural to urban migration, if managed properly, can benefit both rural (sending) and urban (receiving) communities. This book gives highlights of these key issues and related topics that characterize rural to urban migration in Ethiopia.
Its contribution lies in generating empirical evidence regarding the closely intertwined nature of migration and livelihood diversification and the resultant process of rural-urban linkages based on a case study of East Esté wereda and Bahirdar town, Amhara region. The book will provide useful reading for rural and urban development experts, for policy makers, local officials, NGOs, academics, and postgraduate students who hold interest in migration and related issues.

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